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THE NUMBER OF TERMS IN THE SUAREZIAN DISCUSSION ON ESSENCE AND BEING

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I. The Problem of the Terms in the Suarezian Discussion

In the thirty-first of his *Metaphysical Discussions,*[1] Francisco Suarez, having already treated of the Primary Being, proposes to deal with the other member of being's widest division; namely, with the finite and created. First of all, Suarez examines the distinction of being and essence in creatures, listing the various "opinions" on the question.[2] Then he investigates the status of essence prior to its production by God[3] and the difference between essence so considered, which is essence as objective potency, and actual essence, which some have considered to be real subjective potency.[4] Maintaining that a subjective potency to being would be *actual* essence, he locates the problem as that of the distinction between a thing's actual essence and its actual existence. Having emphasized what *actual* essence implies, Suarez shows in clear and flawless reasoning that nothing real *need* be, or *can* be, added to the actual essence in order to make such an essence exist.[5] Consequently he is able to conclude without the least hesitation that any real or modal distinction here is both useless and impossible.[6]

Between actual essence and actual existence in creatures, however, Suarez claims to find a distinction of reason with a basis in reality, the type of distinction which suffices for the categorical assertion that actually to exist is not of a creature's essence.[7]

The present inquiry is concerned principally with this last step in the Suarezian procedure. In establishing a conceptual difference between a thing's essence and existence, Suarez not only sees flaws in the attempts of previous thinkers to arrive at such a distinction but also seems to run into considerable difficulty in explaining his own stand.[8] No longer, at least to a reader trained in the metaphysical technique of St. Thomas Aquinas, has he the air of proceeding with the unhesitating and limpid reasoning in which he had shown the impossibility of a real or modal difference. Rather, he seems to pass back and forth from one notion of essence to another. True, he claims explicitly that he is locating his distinction between the concept of

[1]*Disputationes Metaphysicae,* XXXI; *Opera Omnia* (Paris: Vives, 1856-77), XXVI, 224b. "Terms" in the present study renders what Suarez calls the *extrema* of either a distinction (for instance, ". . . non distingui . . . tanquam duo extrema realia . . ." [*ibid.*, 1, 12; 228a]) or an identity (for instance, ". . . de identitate reali . . . quia haec non est nisi inter extrema positiva et realia . . ." [*ibid.*, 2, 9; 232a]).

[2]*Ibid.*, 1, 1-13; 224b ff. The doctrines of the metaphysicians are drawn up by Suarez as though they were different "opinions" on the same question, quite according to the way in which a problem is treated by the moralists. M. Grabmann, "Die Disputationes Metaphysicae des Franz Suarez," *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* (München: Max Hueber, 1926), p. 534, notes: "Seine Arbeitsweise gemahnt an diejenige seines Lehrers in Salamanca, Henrico Henriquez, dessen Summa theologiae moralis nach der historisch-positiven Seite aüsserst reichhaltig ist." Similarly, D. Bañez, *Scholastica Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae S. Thomae Aquinatis,* I, 3, 4, ed. L. Urbano, (Madrid-Valencia, 1934), I, 147a, had concluded, in the fashion of the moralists, that the real distinction is the *multo probabilior sententia,* while the modal distinction *potest probabiliter sustineri* (*ibid.*, I, 147b). Such a method shows little sensitivity to the requirements of a properly metaphysical procedure, in which opposed conclusions indicate radically different metaphysical starting-points from which they follow with rigorous cogency, not just "probably."

[3]*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI; Vives, XXVI, 229a ff.

[4]*Ibid.*, 3, 1-8; 233a ff. So ". . . essentia autem sub ea consideratione non est in potentia receptiva, sed mere objectiva. Igitur, ut illa locutio et similes aliquem verum sensum habere possint, juxta praedictam sententiam, necesse est intelligi de essentia in actu, quae comparata ad esse, est potentia receptiva illius . . ." (*ibid.*, 5; 234b).

[5]*Ibid.*, 4-5; 235b ff.

[6]*Ibid.*, 6, 1-11; 241b ff.

[7]*Ibid.*, 6, 13; 246a. Text *infra,* n. 82.

[8]*Ibid.*, 6, 13-24; 246a ff.

[9]For instance, ". . . si utraque actu sumatur, solum distingui ratione cum aliquo fundamento in re . . ." (*ibid.*, 6, 13; 246a). ". . . essentiam sub propria ratione essentiae, non tantum ut potentialem, sed etiam ut actualem concipimus, et sic etiam illam ratione distinguimus ab existentia" (*ibid.*, 22; 249b).

actual essence and the concept of actual existence,[9] the concepts of the same terms (*extrema*) whose real identity he had demonstrated. Yet in spite of his protestations he seems finally to emerge with a distinction between, on the one hand, a concept of essence which prescinds from both the potential and the actual and so is *devoid* of all intrinsic actuality in its content and, on the other hand, a concept of *actual* existence. The first term (*extremum*) of the Suarezian distinction between essence and existence, consequently, appears to be quite different from the kind of essence which was found to be identical in reality with existence. Has Suarez in fact changed the first term of the distinction in passing from his rejection of real difference to the assertion of a conceptual distinction? Is it only in this manner that he claims to succeed where he recognizes that so many of his predecessors from Henry of Ghent on have failed?

The situation raises a very actual and interesting question in the present state of metaphysical inquiries regarding human knowledge of being. Reflections of thinkers like Kant and Hegel have shown clearly enough that when "being" is regarded as merely another way of conceptualizing the content of essence or nature, it becomes just in itself an entirely empty concept; it has no content over and above what is already expressed in the notion of the thing; it is just in itself the equivalent of "nothing." Is there any possible way, then, of denying a real distinction between a thing and its being, and then asserting a conceptual distinction between them? Must not such a procedure necessarily require in the notion of being a conceptual content over and above that of the thing's nature or essence? But what foundation can there be in reality for a distinct content in the notion of being, given that any real difference between the thing and its being has already been explicitly denied?

Such is the impasse to which the Suarezian procedure, viewed from the present distance of time and philosophical perspective, would inevitably appear to lead. How was it met by Suarez himself? Was it merely avoided by a subtle change in one of the two terms while passing from real identity to conceptual distinction? Did Suarez himself fall victim to the same snare which lay concealed under the flaws

that he recognized[10] in the arguments of his predecessors who had denied a real distinction?

The answer to such questions, presumably, will lie in a careful scrutiny of the terms (*extrema*) which Suarez is identifying in reality but distinguishing conceptually. Does he retain the same two terms in both stages of his treatment, or does he change one or the other of them? Has he succeeded in showing that a distinct conceptual content may be given to being after being has already been really identified with the thing, or has he like so many others fallen victim to a persistent illusion in this regard? Such is the focal point of interest in the present study.

II. The Terms as Kinds of Being

Since a comparison of essence and being is fundamental for explaining the notion of a creature, Suarez commences,[11] and since it is couched in words which lie open to ambiguity, it calls for an initial clarification of its two terms, essence and being. "Being," he reports, is open to a fourfold acceptation—namely, essential being (*esse essentiae*), existential being (*esse existentiae*), subsistential being (*esse subsistentiae*), and the being of the truth in a proposition (*esse veritatis propositionis*).[12] Of these, the latter two may be excluded from the present problem. Subsistential being is too narrow in its scope to form a term in this question, since it is restricted to one category of being, substance; and the truth in a proposition is not of itself a type of real being but rather an objective kind found in the intellect.[13] Accordingly, only the first two types of being, essential and existential, call for scrutiny in approaching this problem.

Before examining Suarez's own investigation of these two kinds of being, one may be permitted to ask a preliminary question in seeking English equivalents for the phrases involved. What is the exact grammatical force of the genitives in the medieval Latin expressions *esse*

[10] *Ibid.*, 6, 16-21; 247a ff.

[11] ". . . ideo ad declarandum rationem entis creati, a comparatione essentiae et esse initium suminus. . . . radix vero omnium est id quod proposuimus, scilicet quodmodo esse et essentia distinguantur" (*ibid.*, 1, 1; 224b).

[12] ". . . ne sit aequivocatio in verbis, nec sit necessarium postea distinguere de esse essentiae, existentiae, aut subsistentiae, aut veritatis propositionis" (*ibid.*, 1, 2; 224b). Cf. ". . . absque terminorum aequivocatione, quam vereor esse frequentem in hac materia . . ." (*ibid.*, 13; 228b).

[13] *Ibid.*, 1, 2; 225a. Text *infra*, n. 27.

essentiae and *esse existentiae*? In English, the formulae "the being of essence" and "the being of existence" would render them literally enough. But these English expressions are as awkward as the Latin originals must have sounded in the late thirteenth century, if any of Henry of Ghent's students had ears trained to a liking for the purity of the ancient Roman tongue. However, more liberties could naturally be taken with a language which was no longer the vernacular than can be allowed in present-day English. But what is more serious, these awkward English equivalents conceal the same ambiguity to which the grammatical structure of the Latin phrases could give rise. The genitives, as the phrases stand, could be either qualitative or possessive.

True, the genitive in *esse existentiae*, on account of what the notion "existence" signifies, could hardly be understood in any other than a qualitative sense, signifying the *kind* of being which is meant by "existence." Accordingly, this expression may without danger of misunderstanding in a metaphysical context be rendered by the English phrase "existential being." The genitive in the phrase *esse essentiae*, however, as far as sense is concerned, may be taken either as qualitative or as possessive. It may signify "the being which is essence" and so mean the type of being which *coincides* with essence. In this case it could be translated "essential being." On the other hand, the phrase *esse essentiae* could imply the notion of "the being which the essence possesses." Instead of appearing as identical with the essence it could now be contrasted with essence as something *different* from, and possessed by, the essence. If the expression is taken in this latter sense, the distinction between essence and being would consist in a difference between the *esse essentiae* and the essence itself. The distinction would fall between the *being* of the essence and that very essence. In this acceptation *esse essentiae* could not so well be translated "essential being," unless a careful explanation of the phrase in such a sense were first given and then constantly kept in mind.

Suarez himself, in his desire to set aside any ambiguity, immediately undertakes to define with all the precision proper to a legally trained mind the kind of being which is contrasted with essence in the histor-

ical problem of the distinction between essence and being. He examines the notions which he had listed respectively in the first and second place, essential being and existential being. By essential being he understands a kind of *being* which adds nothing real to the essence. The difference between essential being and essence lies only in the manner of conception and signification.[14] Accordingly, Suarez is taking the genitive here in a qualitative sense. He is understanding the phrase as meaning "essential being" in the natural signification of this English rendition; that is, as denoting the kind of being which coincides with essence. No thought of a real distinction between the essence and its essential being is even entertained. Any distinction between them will be only a distinction between two ways of conceiving the same essence or between two different expressions for the same thing. In other words, any difference between them will be at

[14]"Nam esse essentiae, si vere condistinguitur ab existentia, nihil rei addit ipsi essentiae, sed solum differt ab illa in modo quo concipitur vel significatur . . ." (*ibid.*, 1, 2; 224-25). Cf. also texts *infra*, nn. 16 and 62. On Suarez's earlier training in canon law and to a certain extent in civil law, cf. R. de Scorraille, *François Suarez* (Paris: Léthielleux, [1912-13]), I, 30-32.

[15]"Si loquamur de primo esse creaturae: illud sola ratione differt ab essentia creaturae . . ." (Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* I, 9 [Paris, 1518] fol. 7r/v). Cf. "La question que soulève ici Henri n'est pas celle de la distinction reelle à établir entre *l'essence et l'existence*. Non, c'est celle de la distinction de l'être de l'essence d'avec l'essence elle-même. . . . L'être de l'essence et l'essence sont su seul et même concept, et on ne peut y trouver aucune base même pour une distinction de raison" (P. Mandonnet, "Les premières disputes sur la distinction réelle entre l'essence et l'existence, 1276-1287," *Revue Thomiste*, XVIII [1910], 756-57). Such was the way in which the *esse essentiae* continued to be viewed by a student of St. Thomas at the beginning of the present century.

[16]Cf. "Dico secundo: haec constitutio non fit per compositionem talis esse cum tali entitate, sed per identitatem omnimodam secundum rem" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 4, 3; Vives, XXVI, 235b).

[17]"Et hoc est quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium; nec intendimus per illud nisi intentionem esse affirmativi, quia verbum ens signat etiam multas intentiones, ex quibus est certitudo qua est unaquaeque res; et est sicut esse proprium rei" (Avicenna, *Metaphys.*, tr. I, c. 6C; [Venice, 1508], fol. 72vl). So, for example, Henry of Ghent: "Et est hic distinguendum de esse secundum quod distinguit Avicenna in quinto in fine *Metaphysicae suae*, quod quoddam est esse rei quod habet essentialiter de se, quod appellatur *esse essentiae;* quoddam vero quod recipit ab alio, quod appellatur *esse actualis existentiae*" (*Quodl.* I, 9; Paris, 1518, fol. 7r). "Unum enim habet esse naturae extra in rebus, alterum vero habet esse rationis, tertium vero habet esse essentiae" (*ibid.*, III, 9; fol. 61r). ". . . esse essentiae rei appellatur certitudo ejus concepta absolute absque omni conditione quam nata est habere in esse naturae vel rationis" (*ibid.*, fol. 61v). Godfrey of Fontaines: ". . . dicendum quod si ita esset quod esse et essentia differrent re in creaturis, magis posset poni quod creatura posset habere esse essentiae sine esse existentiae quam quod materia posset esse sine forma, quia essentia majorem actualitatem includit quam materia, licet non sit tanta quod possit esse in rerum natura secundum communem cursum sine esse existentiae" (*Quodl.* III, 1; ed. de Wulf-

most a conceptual and perhaps just a nominal distinction.

Henry of Ghent, in the beginning of the historic controversy on the whole question, had similarly declared that only a distinction of reason fell between essence and essential being.[15] But he had not offered any explanation of how the two concepts were distinguished. Like Henry, Suarez has no interest in further examining the nature of this proposed conceptual distinction. Suarez is concerned only to imply that no problem of a real distinction can arise here; the two terms of the controverted distinction cannot be essence and essential being. He is content merely to take for granted that any distinction maintained between these will at most be a conceptual distinction, insisting only that essential being is *completely identified*[16] in reality with essence.

The being which is signified by *esse* in the phrase *esse essentiae* is therefore definitely not the being which is to be distinguished from essence in the problem under discussion. It is, true enough, a kind of *being*, but it is a type of being which is straightway identified with essence and considered as the first term of the proposed distinction. It coincides with essence and is contrasted for purposes of the distinction with another kind of being, existential being. The kind of *being* which is signified by the formula "essential being" falls consequently on the side of the first term in the present problem. It is in fact precisely what is to be distinguished from "existence," either really or conceptually.

Suarez's acceptation of the phrase *esse essentiae* in this sense is in full accord with the long history of the expression. From Henry of Ghent on, the genitive *essentiae* was regularly understood as qualitative. It specified a type of being which corresponded to what the Latin rendition of Avicenna had termed the "proper being" (*esse proprium*) of the essence, as distinct from the further being which the essence acquired in the mind or in reality. Except in the remarkable case of St. Thomas Aquinas, it was the type of being which the medievals who had developed their metaphysical doctrines against this Avicennian background assigned to the essence in its own nature, essence considered in abstraction from real or cognitional existence. It was unhesitatingly identified in this tradition with the essence itself and was regularly contrasted with actual existential being.[17]

In its historical background, accordingly, the grammatical structure of the phrase *esse essentiae* is to be interpreted in exact correspondence with that of the phrase to which it was regularly opposed, *esse existentiae*. The genitive in the latter expression, as has been noted, is clearly qualitative. The genitive in *esse essentiae* may likewise be expected to occur invariably in a qualitative sense. It may therefore be regularly translated "essential being." As Suarez uses it, moreover, this rendition need not give rise to any hesitation, since he employs the Latin *esse essentiale* synonymously with *esse essentiae*.[18] The possibility that the genitive might have the force of a possessive which would allow the essence to be understood as other than the being may for practical purposes be ruled out of consideration. Suarez, as a matter of fact, in locating the terms for the problem of the distinc-

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Pelzer, in *Les philosophes belges* [Louvain, 1904], II, 304). Duns Scotus: ". . . esse, sive essentiae sive existentiae, quia unum non est sine altero, qualitercumque distinguantur . . ." (*Op. Ox.*, I, 36, 1, no. 11; ed. M. F. Garcia [Quaracchi, 1912], I, 1177 [no. 1084]). On St. Thomas Aquinas, cf. *infra*, n. 20. On *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae* in Giles of Rome, cf. P. Nash, S.J., "The Accidentality of Esse according to Giles of Rome," *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII (1957), 107-11.

[18]"Alio modo sumitur esse essentiae, ut actu convenit creaturae. . . , et consequenter esse essentiale illius esse actuale esse" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 2, 11; Vives, XXVI, 232b). In another connection, Suarez writes: "Si vero loquamur sub his nominibus *esse essentiae et esse existentiae*, utrumque habet eumdem significandi modum et subordinatur eidem modo concipiendi" (*ibid.*, 6, 19; 248a).

[19]*Ibid.*, 1, 1-2; 224-25. Cf. texts *supra*, nn. 14 and 16.

[20]In the *De Ente et Essentia* of St. Thomas Aquinas, the notion of essence, though sketched in the Avicennian background, abstracts from all being whatsoever: "Ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat precisio alicuius eorum" (*De Ente*, cap. 3; ed. Roland-Gosselin [Paris: Vrin, 1948], p. 26 ll. 8-10). Elsewhere St. Thomas states that *every* aspect of being comes from without, and that only the *lack* of being is contributed by the finite thing: ". . . ita quod quamcumque rationem essendi aliquid habeat, non sit sibi nisi a Deo, sed defectus essendi sit a seipso" (*In* II *Sent.*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, sol.; ed. P. Mandonnet [Paris: Léthielleux, 1929], II, 946).

[21]". . . sicut essentia creaturae ut sic, ex vi sui conceptus non dicit quod sit aliquid reale actu habens esse extra causas suas, ita esse essentiae ut sic, praecise in illo sistendo, non dicit esse actuale, quo essentia extra causas constituatur in actu; nam si esse in actu hoc modo non est de essentia creaturae, nec pertinere poterit ad esse essentiae ejus; ergo esse essentiae creaturae ut sic ex se praescindit ab esse actuali extra causas, quo res creata fit extra nihil, quod nomine esse existentiae actualis significamus" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 1, 2; Vives, 225a). For Suarez, accordingly, essence not only abstracts but also prescinds from existence. In fact, the two notions of abstracting and prescinding are used synonomously by him (cf. texts *infra* nn. 84 and 97), or at least precision is taken as a subdivision of abstraction (cf. text, n. 92 *infra*). For St. Thomas, on the contrary, finite essence abstracts but does not prescind from being. Cf. Suarez, *ibid.*, II, 4, 9; XXV, 90b, and the text from *De Ente, supra*, n. 20.

[22]Cf. *supra*, nn. 3-7.

tion, from the start explicitly identifies essential *being* with the essence and contrasts it with the existential being which forms the other term of the distinction.[19]

For Suarez, then, the first term in the problem, "essence," clearly means "essential *being*." It explicitly signifies a certain type of *being*, even though that kind of being coincides with the essence itself. The term "essence," accordingly, as it plays its role in the problem under discussion, by no means abstracts from *all* being.[20] It is not conceived as of itself not having any kind of being whatever in abstraction from the existence which it receives in reality or in the mind; it is not introduced as of itself simply lacking all being. In Suarez's own description as well as in the historical background from which he took the phrase *esse essentiae*, the first term of the problem, essence, is understood as a definite type of *being* in its own right, though it purports to be conceived under the aspect of "being" without the injection of any existential characteristic.

Even with these features made clear, however, the notion of "essential being" for Suarez is still not free from ambiguity. It is introduced as something which on the strength of its own proper concept does not imply real actual being outside its causes. Of itself it *prescinds* from such actual being, and in this precision it is contrasted with actual existential being in the opening section of the thirty-first *Metaphysical Discussion*.[21] Yet the Suarezian procedure, as sketched above,[22] expressly seeks to establish the real identity and conceptual distinction of *actual* essence and actual existence. In the introductory presentation of the key notions, however, what is contrasted with actual existence is a type of essential being which, taken just on the strength of its own concept, prescinds from actual being. Certainly the danger of ambiguity seems latent in this procedure.

Later on, accordingly, a twofold signification of essential being is in fact explicitly emphasized. "Essential being" may be attributed to creatures, first, as taken just in itself, even though the creatures are not yet existent. In this sense it means *possible* being and so signifies being merely in its causes or objectively in the intellect. It is accordingly classed under cognitional, not real, being. Secondly, "essential

being" may mean actual being, as found in existing things, whether such actual being be distinguished really or conceptually from existence. This distinction between possible and actual essential being has to be kept in mind, Suarez insists, in order to offset the dangers of ambiguity and to understand the force of the arguments used in the whole question.[23]

The first kind of essential being, then, is merely possible being, and as such is found only in cognition and not in reality. Does this coincide exactly with the introductory notion of essential being which was given in the opening section of the *Discussion*?[24] There the sense was that of essence on the strength of its own concept, essence which prescinded from actual being outside its causes. Here likewise the

[23]". . . advertendum est, aequivocationem esse posse in primo membro, scilicet, esse essentiae. Duobus enim modis attribuitur rebus creatis. Uno modo secundum se, etiam ut nondum sunt factae, neque actu existentes. Et hoc modo esse essentiae non est verum esse reale actuale in creatura, ut demonstratum est, sed est esse possibile, et revocatur ad illud tertium membrum de esse veritatis propositionis seu cognitionis; nam, ut ostendimus, essentiae creaturarum hoc modo tantum habent, vel esse in causa, vel objective in intellectu. . . . ideo peculiariter tribuitur rebus creatis esse essentiae antequam existant, ut denotetur illam veritatem fundari in esse potentiali apto ad existendum. Alio modo sumitur esse essentiae, ut actu convenit creaturae jam existenti, et hoc esse est sine dubio reale et actuale, sive re, sive ratione tantum ab existentia distinguatur . . . Et haec distinctio est prae oculis habenda ad tollendam aequivocationem et intelligendam efficaciam rationum, quae in hac materia fieri solent" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, xxxi, 2, 11; Vives, 232b). On certain ways in which potential essence may be considered real and actual, cf. texts *infra*, nn. 49 and 50.

[24]Text *supra*, n. 21.

[25]Cf. ". . . essentia, abstracte et praecise concepta, ut est in potentia . . ." (*Dis. Metaphys.*, xxxi, 1, 13; Vives, 228b). ". . . si essentia creaturae praecise ac secundum se sumpta, et nondum facta . . . " (*ibid.*, 2, 10; 232a). Nevertheless, the essence just in itself may be contrasted with its objective status: ". . . essentias reales, non secundum statum quem habent objective in intellectu, sed secundum se, vel quatenus aptae sunt ad existendum . . ." (*ibid.*, 232b). It may also be looked upon as common or indifferent to both potential and actual essence; cf. texts *infra*, nn. 85, 92, and 97.

[26]"Nam per existentiam res intelligitur esse aliquid in rerum natura; oportet ergo ut et ipsa aliquid reale sit, et sit intima, id est intra ipsam rem existens" (*ibid.*, 1, 2; 225a). "Certum est apud omnes, existentiam esse id quo formaliter et intrinsice res est actu existens . . . (*ibid.*, 5, 1; 237b). ". . . certum tamen est existens ut sic per solam existentiam formaliter constitui, et in hoc genere quasi formalis causae ab illa sola pendere . . ." (*ibid.*). However, ". . . de entitate essentiae, et entitate existentiae, si essent distinctae; componerent enim unum, verbi gratia, hoc existens, respectu cujus existentia se haberet ut actus intrinsecus et formalis; tamen respectu entitatis essentiae nullo modo posset intrinsece illam constituere aut componere, quia una ab alia condistingueretur, ut entitas simplex ab entitate simplici" (*ibid.*, 6, 3; 242b). "Verissimum etiam est existentiam non posse esse causam formalem intrinsece constituentem actualem entitatem essentiae. Hinc tamen concludimus, nullam posse assignari constitutum propter quod talis entitas necessaria sit . . . " (*ibid.*, 6; 243b). The force of this intrinsic character of existence for Suarez, accordingly, is such

first notion of essential being is introduced as taken just in itself. But a negative restriction is made immediately by adding as a condition the nonexistence of the creature. Does the necessity of appending this restriction imply that essential being taken just in itself could be found indifferently in either potential or actual essence?

An indifferent or common notion of essence, naturally, could be expected in this context on account of the Avicennian background of the long historical controversy, in which essence taken in itself included neither real nor cognitional being but was common to both. Essence just in itself and on the strength of its own concept, accordingly, should be found in both potential and actual essential being. For practical purposes, however, Suarez here as elsewhere in the *Discussion*,[25] may limit the notion of "essential being just in itself" to potential being, somewhat arbitrarily, by adding as a restriction the nonactuality of the essence. From this standpoint the basis for his consideration is the difference between real and cognitional being. Actual essence is properly real being; essence as just in itself and potential essence have only cognitional being. To that extent the two latter have the same status, and from that viewpoint they may for Suarez be contrasted with actual essence. Suarez himself is not concerned with emphasizing either their identity or their distinction from each other. Yet as far as can be surmised from the texts just considered, one may be prepared to find three senses of the Suarezian "essential being," first as just in itself, secondly as possible being, and thirdly as actual being.

The other term of the distinction, which is called "existence" or simply "being" (*esse*), is described as meaning the actual being of things outside nothing and outside their causes. It is that by which, formally and intrinsically, a thing is actually existing. The force of the notion "intrinsically" is not explained for the moment, except through contrast to an extrinsic denomination and to a being produced only in human reason. It quite evidently, however, means being which is intrinsic to the existent, when the existent is *considered* as in some way a composite which contains within itself both essence and existence. However, Suarez explains that while intrinsic to the existent, it would not be intrinsic to the essence itself if the two were really distinct.[26]

What type of being corresponds to such a description of existence? Of the four kinds of being originally listed, existential being is the only type found to meet these requirements for the second term in the distinction between essence and being. "Essential being" is completely identified with essence as the first term of the distinction. "Subsistential being" is not only too narrow but also is separable from the substantial existence of a creature. "The being of the truth in a proposition" is not of itself a real and intrinsic type of being.[27] "Existential being," in the sense of actual being outside nothing and outside causes, is accordingly the only kind of being which can constitute the second term of the problem in question.

To avoid ambiguity, then, the distinction between essence and being is posed by Suarez as the distinction between essential *being* and existential *being*. Yet ambiguity is still possible. Just as in the case of essential being, so also with existential being, as Suarez will show later,[28] is there question of a twofold sense. Existence, considered entirely in the line of existence, may be looked upon as either actual or potential. Actual existence, accordingly, is distinguished formally from potential existence by its own actual entity, which potential existence lacks. The notion of existence in the full extent of its signification,

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that it entails real identity of essence and existence. "Si Suarez veut que l'existence de l'être soit au dedans de lui, c'est qu'il entend déjà qu'elle s'identifie avec lui" (Léon Mahieu, *François Suarez* [Paris: Desclée, De Brouwer, & Cie, 1921], p. 167). The notion carries its difficulties. Bañez, on the other side of the controversy, had concluded "existentia aliquid reale est, et intrinsicum rei existenti" (*In ST, I, 3, 4;* Urbano, I, 143a). But in arguing for his real distinction, Bañez is forced to maintain "solum ordo ad esse est intrinsecus omni rei" (*ibid.*, 147a). For some further historical details on characterizing existence as intrinsic or extrinsic, cf. I. Bonetti, "Il Valore dell'Esistenza nella Metafisica di San Tommaso," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza), LIV (1951), 365-66.

[27]"Esse autem subsistentiae, et contractius est quam esse existentiae; hoc enim substantiae et accidentibus commune est, illud vero est substantiae proprium; et praeterea esse subsistentiae (ut suppono ex infra probandis) distinctum quid est ab esse existentiae substantialis naturae creatae, et separabile ab ipso . . . Esse autem veritatis propositionis, ex se non est esse reale et intrinsecum, sed est esse quoddam objectivum in intellectu componente, unde convenit etiam privationibus" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 1, 2; Vives, 225a).

[28]Cf. texts *infra*, nn. 64-65.

[29]Cf. ". . . talis entitas, addita actuali essentiae, nec potest illi formaliter conferre primam (ut ita dicam) actualitatem seu primam rationem entis in actu . . ." (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 6, 2; Vives, XXVI, 242a). Essence in contradistinction to existence is considered: ". . . quasi primum constitutivum illius rei" (*ibid.*, 15; 246b). For St. Thomas, on the contrary, "Primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum . . ." (*De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 4c; ed. Mandonnet, II, 52a). "Primus autem effectus Dei in rebus est ipsum esse, quod omnes alii effectus praesupponunt, et supra quod fundantur" (*Comp. Theol.*, cap. 68). Cf. *infra*, n. 80.

then, does not for Suarez necessarily denote actuality. Being, whether existential or essential, can designate the merely potential. But no matter how essence and existence may be taken, they are in any case expressed by Suarez as two types of *being*. His problem is whether or not these two terms are in reality one and the same kind of being, and if they are, how they are to be conceptually distinguished in a way that will safeguard the Christian doctrine of creation.

The terms of the Suarezian problem, accordingly, in a historical background which reaches to the last quarter of the thirteenth century, are expressed as two different kinds of *being*, essential being and existential being. So proposed, they are meant to bring up the question of whether, though expressed in human language as two different kinds of *being*, they are outside the mind two kinds or only one kind of being. In other words, are they really distinct in themselves, or does their distinction arise from the human manner of expressing them? In the actually and really existent thing itself, are these two alleged types of being identical or not? Each of the two terms is indeed expressed in a way that seems to indicate distinct proper being for each in its own right. But outside the mind, in the thing itself, are they two really different types of *being*? Or are essential being and existential being just one and the same kind of being in the existent thing? In this latter case, may they be conceived by the intellect in two different ways and expressed by intrinsically different concepts without allowing any real distinction between different kinds of being outside the mind?

The distinction, then, in the historical background in which Suarez wrote, is undoubtedly meant as a distinction between two types of *being*. It is *certainly not* a distinction between one term which lacks all being whatsoever (both real and cognitional), on the one hand, and on the other, the being which *first* makes that term *be*. On the contrary, the second term in the distinction, existence, is not presented as the first being of the essence.[20] Rather, existential being is explicitly contrasted with another type of being, essential being, being which belongs to the essence under the aspect of essence alone. The essence has its own being, is completely identified with its essential being; and that being, coinciding entirely with essence, is set up as the first

term in the problem. The other term of the controverted distinction is also presented as being, namely, as existential being. The problem regards only the difference between these two types of being.

How can the question, in this framework, be other than whether an essence which *already is* needs further and really distinct being to make it exist? More pointedly, can an essence which already has *being* be constituted an *existent* by any other type of being than that being which it already has? Is a further type of being necessary to make such an essence exist, or is it even possible for a further type of being to exercise such a function in regard to an essence which already actually *is*? Presented in this way, how can the framework of the problem point to any but a decidedly negative answer to such questions? Indeed, if it were not for the historical fact that outstanding

[30]For example, Capreolus: "Quia, sicut dicit Henricus, et bene, meo judicio, essentia habet duplex esse, scilicet esse essentiae, et esse existentiae . . ." (*Defensiones, In* II *Sent.*, 1, 2, 3; ed. Paban-Pèques [Turin, 1902], III, 76a). Cajetan: ". . . esse est duplex scilicet existentiae et essentiae . . ." (*In De Ente et Essentiae*, cap. 5; ed. H. H. Laurent [Turin, 1934], no. 101, p. 158). St. Thomas, *In* I *Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, (ed. Mandonnet [Paris: Léthielleux, 1929], I, 766) reports the current use of *esse* to denote the essence of a thing. This usage, entirely in accord with the Aristotelian and Boethian traditions, may be seen in William of Auvergne: ". . . esse duas habet intentiones, et una earum . . . est proprie quod nominatur essentia . . . Secunda autem intentio hujus quod est esse, est illud quod dicitur per hoc verbum, est, de unoquoque, et est praeter uniuscujusque rationem" (*De Trin.*, cap. 2; ed. Paris [1674], p. 2b [suppl.]). But in his own usage St. Thomas consistently reserves the infinitive *esse* to denote the being which is other than the essence of finite things.

[31]"De hac igitur existentia creaturae variae sunt opiniones. Prima est, existentiam esse rem quamdam distinctam omnino realiter ab entitate essentiae creaturae. Haec existimatur esse opinio D. Thomae, quam in hoc sensu secuti sunt fere omnes antiqui Thomistae. . . . Quae sic interpretatur Capreol. . . . Item Aegid. . . . Citantur etiam Albert., sup. lib. de *Causis*, propos. 8; *Avicen.*, lib. quinto suae Metaph., cap. primo" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 1, 3; Vives, XXVI, 225ab). The use which Suarez makes of his explicitly mentioned sources has been carefully studied by N. Wells, in an unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Distinction of Essence and Existence in the Philosophy of Francis Suarez" (University of Toronto, 1955).

[32]". . . differt ab eo cujus est actus re quidem . . ." (*In* I *Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 471) ". . . compositum reali compositione . . ." (*De Ver.*, q. 27, a. 1 ad 8; in *Quaest. Disp.*, ed. Mandonnet [Paris: Léthielleux, 1925], I, 693b). ". . . differunt realiter . . ." (*In De Hebd.*, cap. 2; in *Opusc.*, ed. Mandonnet [Paris: Léthielleux, 1927], I, 175). The Thomistic distinction between a thing and its being, however, is wider than a real distinction. It means that the thing is different from the being which it receives in cognition as well as from the being which it receives in reality. Not only the being which the thing receives in reality but also the being which it receives in cognition comes from without the essence and ultimately from God. Cf.: "Sed hoc esse non est nisi esse rationis . . . et secundum hoc quod in ratione esse habet, constat quod a Deo est" (*In* II *Sent.*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3; ed. Mandonnet, II, 947).

commentators[30] had faced the problem in this framework and answered affirmatively, could one even hold the question worthy of any consideration at all? Outside such a peculiar historical background would the notion of a kind of *being* which is really different from *existence* ever be expected to arise?

As it is, one can only watch and see if the Suarezian treatment of the problem is in actual fact concerned with a useless and impossible addition of being to something which already *is*. Returning to the text of the thirty-first *Metaphysical Discussion*, one has the opportunity to observe how, after having set aside the initial ambiguity in the terms essence and being by locating them as essential being and existential being, Suarez proceeds to interpret the centuries-old controversy about the problem to which they have given rise when taken in this way.

III. The Terms as Realities

Regarding existence in the sense just determined (that is, as actual existence), Suarez reports, there are different opinions. The first is that existence is a certain thing (*rem quamdam*) really distinct in the fullest sense from the entity of a creature's essence. This, Suarez says, is thought to be the opinion of St. Thomas. It is the sense in which almost all the ancient Thomists understand the problem. It is the teaching of Giles of Rome, and Albert and Avicenna are cited in its favor.[31]

Such is the way in which Suarez records the doctrine he is about to oppose. He seems to hesitate to attribute it to St. Thomas. He may have good reason for so hesitating, since the formulae in which this distinction is presented are nowhere used in the authentic works of the Angelic Doctor. Suarez lists the principal passages of St. Thomas which treat of the distinction between essence and being. Not one of these describes existence as a thing or a reality (*res*), and not one of them refers to essence as having an entity of its own when considered in abstraction from its existence. Nor does any of them characterize the distinction between a thing and its being as "real." Elsewhere on a few particular occasions[32] St. Thomas does use that desig-

nation. These few places are sufficient to allow the word "real" as a designation for the Thomistic distinction; but their occasional character and their relative scarcity in comparison with the numerous passages in which no mention of "real" is made may easily give rise to a doubt about whether the notion "real" does full justice to the distinction set forth in the Thomistic texts. In any case, Suarez can well be reserved in attributing this first "opinion" absolutely to St. Thomas, just as his somewhat older contemporary, Bañez, had been cautious in naming the Angelic Doctor as its patron.[33] But with regard to those whom he cites as "Thomists," Suarez is on surer ground. Among the commentators from Capreolus on, in fact, he could hardly have any doubt at all. Of the more immediate followers[34] of St. Thomas, on the other hand, he does not include any in his list of the proponents of the real distinction, Harvey of Nédellec being placed among the defenders of a distinction of reason.

The mention of Giles of Rome, however, locates the doctrine very definitely. For Giles the formulae stating that being is *accidental* to creatures, is *received* in the nature of a creature, gives rise to a *real difference* in created things—these formulae were not enough to explain the distinction between essence and being in a way sufficient to safeguard the revealed doctrine of creation. To defend creation, essence and existence in creatures have to be established as two different things (*res*).[35] In the controversy which followed between Giles and Henry of Ghent, these two terms of the distinction received the names

[33]"Haec conclusio videtur esse D. Tho. in locis citatis" (Bañez, *In ST*, I, 3, 4; Urbano, I, 147a).

[34]For a survey, cf. E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 420-27; E. Hocedez, *Aegidii Romani Theoremata de Esse et Essentia* (Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1930), pp. (84)-(117).

[35]Cf. texts cited by Hocedez, *Aegidii Romani Theoremata* pp. (13)-(16).

[36]The sort of Gallup Poll which Hocedez (*supra*, n. 34) has taken of the Dominicans during the seventy years after the death of St. Thomas results (*ibid.*, p. [106]) in an ideal Gallup Poll result: one third find the real distinction in St. Thomas; one third deny that it is there; and one third say that they do not know.

[37]For Giles, essence and existence were *res* in the same sense that matter and quantity were *res*. "Et, sicut materia et quantitas sunt duae res, sic essentia et esse sunt duae res realiter differentes" (*Theoremata de Esse et Essentia*, XIX; ed. Hocedez, p. 134, ll. 11-13). So, for Suarez, matter and form are regarded; cf. text *infra*, n. 41.

[38]"Multo probabilior sententia est et ad rem theologicam magis accommodata, quod *esse* realiter tanquam res a re distinguitur ab *essentia*" (Bañez, *In ST* I, 3, 4; Urbano, I, 147a).

[39]"Primum, quia praedicata essentialia conveniunt creaturae absque interventu causae efficientis; propter hoc enim ab aeterno fuit verum dicere, hominem esse animal rationale; sed existentia non convenit creaturae, nisi per causam efficien-

"essential being" (*esse essentiae*) and "existential being" (*esse existentiae*). The problem treated was, accordingly, whether essential being and existential being were one and the same thing (*res*), or whether they were two different realities (*res*) apart from any consideration of the human intellect. Understood in this way, the question of the distinction between the two became a standard problem in the quodlibetal literature of the epoch; and for a considerable time opinion seems to have been equally divided regarding the side of the controversy on which the doctrine contained in the Thomistic texts should be ranged.[86]

Against this historical background, then, Suarez is representing the "first opinion" as teaching that existence or existential being is a certain thing (*res*) which is really distinct from the entity of the essence. He is apparently conceiving existence as a *thing*. If the English word "thing" seems a bit too harsh to translate *res* in this context, "reality" may perhaps better convey the notion involved.[87] In any case, Suarez is expressing himself as though created existence can be conceived by itself as a reality, and the question can be asked whether such a reality is really different from the entity of the essence. This would show that he is likewise conceiving essence, or essential being, as a reality in its own right, and allowing in a similar way the question to be asked whether it is the same reality or a different reality from existence.

Is Suarez then not only using the expressions but also actually conceiving the terms of this problem in the way those terms had been understood in the controversy that dates from the time of Henry and Giles, and as they were conceived in his own immediate background, for instance, by Bañez?[88] The answer to this query has to emerge from the way in which Suarez understands the arguments used for and against a real or modal distinction between the two.

The first argument which Suarez reports as offered in favor of a real distinction is that the essential predicates belong to a creature without any intervention on the part of an efficient cause. This is claimed to show that "the being of a creature is a reality (*res*) distinct from its essence, because one and the same reality (*una et eadem res*) cannot be and not be through an efficient cause."[89] The essence is here pre-

sented as a reality which has its predicates independently of an efficient cause. It therefore should not be the same reality as that which has being only through efficient causality. Each is understood, clearly, as a reality.

Similarly, the second argument reported is that the being of a creature, because received, has to be a reality (*res*) distinct from the essence, because the same reality cannot be received in itself.[40] Here again, the essence is represented as a reality which would have to receive in itself another reality, the existence. Again, each term is evidently taken as a reality.

The fourth argument concludes that existence is a reality distinct (*res distincta*) from the whole essence, for it is a simple *entity* and so cannot be the same reality (*eadem res*) as something composed of two distinct realities (*cum re composita ex rebus distinctis*). As a simple entity it has to be a reality entirely distinct (*res omnino distincta*) from such a composite essence.[41] In this argument existence is looked upon as an *entity* distinct from the *entity* of the essence as

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tem, et ideo non potest creatura dici actu esse, nisi facta sit; ergo esse creaturae est res distincta ab essentia ejus, quia non potest una et eadem res esse, et non esse per efficientem causam" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, xxxi, 1, 4; Vives, xxvi, 225b).

The history of the first two arguments cited by Suarez for the real distinction may be found in N. Wells, "Distinction of Essence and Existence in the Philosophy of Suarez," pp. 5-50. Dr. Wells's conclusion (*ibid.*, p. 50) is that Suarez's presentation of the two arguments is in substance faithful to the way in which they are used by the authors whom he lists.

[40]"Secundo argumentor, quia esse creaturae est esse receptum in aliquo; ergo in essentia, non enim potest excogitari aliud in quo recipiatur; ergo est res distincta ab essentia, non enim potest eadem res in seipsa recipi" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, xxxi, 5; Vives, xxvi, 225b).

[41]"Quarto, in substantia composita ex materia et forma, esse est quid distinctum a materia et a forma, et a natura composita ex utraque; ergo est res distincta a tota essentia talis substantiae . . . non potest simplex entitas esse eadem res cum re composita ex rebus distinctis . . . oportet ut sit res omnino distincta a tali essentia" (*ibid.*, 1, 7; 226ab).

[42]"Secunda sententia est, esse creatum distingui quidem ex natura rei, seu (ut alii loquuntur) formaliter, ab essentia cujus est esse, et non esse propriam entitatem omnino realiter distinctam ab entitate essentiae, sed modum ejus" (*ibid.*, 1, 11, 227b).

[43]". . . hactenus enim factum non est, nec verisimile est fieri posse ut conservetur existentia albedinis non conservata albedine, et homo habeat existentiam albi, et non sit albus, et sic de aliis . . ." (*ibid.*, 228a).

[44]". . . ideo existimo non loqui consequenter, qui priorem distinctionem negando hanc admittunt in praesenti materia" (*ibid.*, 6, 9; 244b). Cf. texts *infra*, nn. 79 and 80.

[45]Suarez cannot see existence as merely a *quo* and not in some way a *quod*. ". . . sed solum esse quo aliud est. Sed hoc potius est vocibus ludere, quam difficultatem solvere; nam, licet existentia non dicatur esse vel existere tanquam suppositum, quod propriissime est, tamen non est dubium quin, generalius loquendo, ita vere existat, sicut existunt accidentia, vel partes, et alia entia incompleta" (*ibid.*, 6,

mentioned in the formulation of this "first opinion." These entities are presented as two different realities somewhat as matter and form are considered to be two distinct realities. Both terms, accordingly, are only too obviously looked upon as realities. The other arguments listed, though in no way adverse to this interpretation of the distinction's terms, do not articulate the conception of opposed realities.

With regard to the "second opinion," that of the modal distinction, Suarez is rather brief. He describes it as asserting that created being "is not a proper entity really distinct in the full sense from the entity of the essence, but is its mode."[42] He conceives this position, accordingly, as taking for granted that the essence has its own proper entity, which is distinguished from existence not as one entity from another entity properly so called, but as an entity from a mode. The composition of entity and mode, nevertheless, seems still to be conceived as a composition between two different realities. It allows one to speak about the existence as something which might be thought of as conserved without its essence, even though such an eventuality has never occurred and is not likely to be even possible.[43] In such a way of speaking, quite apparently, one conceives the existence as a reality in its own right and can ask the question whether such a reality could be conserved alone, even though a negative answer is given. Suarez, in fact, cannot see how anyone can consistently deny a *real* distinction between essence and being and still maintain a modal one.[44]

This way of understanding the arguments for a real or a modal distinction between essence and being shows therefore that both terms in the problem are in fact looked upon as realities and, at least in the treatment of the "first opinion," as entities. It is not at all a question of a distinction between existence and an essence which has no entity and is not a reality when considered in contradistinction to existence. The first term, essence, is not regarded as literally a nothing in itself when contrasted with its being. Somewhat similarly the second term, created existence, is viewed as a reality in its own right, as though in itself it were something which can either exist or not exist.[45] The terms of the distinction, then, essential being and existential being, are each presented as a true reality, even when one is placed in contrast to the other.

This notion of "reality" (*res*), accordingly, can hardly help implying the character of actuality in both essential and existential being, since for Suarez what is truly real is actual. The terms are as a matter of fact explained as actual by Suarez as he introduces the "third opinion," the view which he himself holds to be entirely true. This view is that actual essence and actual existence are not distinguished in reality, although essence conceived abstractly and with precision, as it is in potency, is distinct from actual existence as a nonbeing from a being.[46]

12; 245b). It would be hard to find a more blunt expression of a radically essentialist conception of being. Cf. St. Thomas: ". . . sicut esse rei dicitur ens; non quia ejus sit aliquid aliud esse; sed quia per hoc esse res esse dicitur . . ." (*De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 5 ad 8; ed. Mandonnet, I, 521a). ". . . nec materia nec forma potest dici quod est, nec etiam ipsum esse" (*CG*, II, cap. 54; ed. Leonine, XIII, 392a26-28).

[46]"Haec opinio tertia sic explicanda est, ut comparatio fiat inter actualem existentiam, quam vocant esse in actu exercito, et actualem essentiam existentem. Et sic affirmat haec sententia existentiam et essentiam non distingui in re ipsa, licet essentia, abstracte et praecise concepta, ut est in potentia, distinguatur ab existentia actuali, tanquam non ens ab ente. Et hanc sententiam sic explicatam existimo esse omnino veram" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 1, 13; Vives, XXVI, 228b).

[47]"Ejusque fundamentum breviter est, quia non potest res aliqua intrinsece ac formaliter constitui in ratione entis realis et actualis, per aliud distinctum ab ipsa, quia, hoc ipso quod distinguitur unum ab alio, tanquam ens ab ente, utrumque habet quod sit ens, ut condistinctum ab alio, et consequenter non per illud formaliter et intrinsece" (*ibid.*).

[48]Cf. texts *supra*, nn. 21 and 23.

[49]"Principio statuendum est, essentiam creaturae, seu creaturam de se, et priusquam a Deo fiat, nullum habere in se verum esse reale, et in hoc sensu, praeciso esse existentiae, essentiam non esse rem aliquam, sed omnino esse nihil" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 2, 1; Vives, XXVI, 229a). Suarez, however, citing Cajetan, acknowledges another sense of "real," which is not its proper sense: ". . . ens reale dupliciter accipi: uno modo, ut distinguitur contra ens fabricatum ab intellectu (quod proprie est ens rationis); alio modo, ut distinguitur contra existens actu. Essentia ergo creaturae secundum se est ens reale primo modo, scilicet, in potentia, non vero posteriori modo, et in actu, quod est proprie esse ens reale. . . ." (*ibid.*, 2, 10; 232a). Cf. *ibid.*, II, 6-7; Vives, XXV, 89-90.

[50]". . . esse, quod appellant essentiae ante effectionem, seu creationem divinam, solum est esse potentiale objectivum (ut multi loquuntur, de quo statim), seu per denominationem extrinsecam a potentia Dei, et non repugnantiam ex parte essentiae creabilis (*ibid.*, XXXI, 2, 2; Vives XXVI, 230a). For Suarez, the cognitional existence of a potential essence means the *actual* being not of something real but of an *ens rationis*. "Quocirca, si essentia creaturae praecise ac secundum se sumpta, et nondum facta, consideretur ut actu ens, vel ei tribuatur actu esse, sic vel non est consideranda in se, sed in sua causa, nec habet aliud esse reale ab esse suae causae; vel si consideretur ac in se habens esse, sic verum est, secundum eam considerationem, non esse ens reale, sed rationis, quia non est in se, sed objective tantum in intellectu" (*ibid.*, 2, 10; 232a).

[51]". . . fatendum ergo necessario est, seclusa entitate existentiae, quae per effectionem aliquam communicatur creaturae, ipsam entitatem essentiae omnino nihil esse" (*ibid.*, 2, 5; 230b).

The essence, then, may be conceived abstractly and with precision. This essence, as in potency, is now distinguished from *actual* existence as a nonbeing from a being. The second term, existence, when *actual,* is therefore looked upon as *a* being (*ens*). With existence so regarded, Suarez lays down as his *fundamental norm* that a thing cannot be formally and intrinsically constituted as a real and actual being by something distinct from itself, for in this way the two would be distinguished from each other as one being from another being (*tamquam ens ab ente*). Each is already a being (*ens*); and therefore neither can be constituted a being, formally and intrinsically, by the other.[47]

This reasoning means that once something has actuality, it is a being. It is no longer a nonbeing *conceived* as a being. It does not need anything else, and cannot allow anything else, to constitute it as a being, since it already is just that. Accordingly, the Suarezian notion of actuality and its relation to being requires close examination. It is, in fact, given careful and detailed treatment by Suarez himself in explaining the view which he has undertaken to defend.

Essential being, he had insisted when introducing the notion,[48] does not of itself mean actual being. Of itself it prescinds from actual being. This is now explained in greater detail. The essence of a creature, before it is produced by God, has in itself no true or real being. As such it is not a thing; it is altogether nothing.[49] Essential being, before its production in reality, is therefore only objective potential being (*esse potentiale objectivum*).[50] Without its existential entity, the essential entity in itself is entirely nothing.[51]

Accordingly, essential being can be taken as either actual or potential. As actual, it is never found apart from *real* existence. As potential, it is not a reality (*res*). As potential, therefore, it cannot be expected to form the first term of the distinction between essence and being, for this is a distinction between two realities, as the history of the controversy has established. Suarez does not show the least hesitation here, for he does not appear to see any reason for going outside the confines of the definite historical controversy. The first

term of the distinction, therefore, has to be actual essential being. It will be the essential entity which is found joined to existential entity and never separate from it.

In a Christian background Suarez shows without difficulty that no creature can be *real* unless it has been freely produced by God. So

[53]"Nec potuit in mentem alicujus Doctoris Catholici venire, quod essentia creaturae ex se, et absque efficientia libera Dei, sit aliqua vera res, aliquod verum esse reale habens distinctum ab esse Dei. . . . quia solus Deus est ens ex se necessarium, et sine illo factum est nihil, et sine effectione ejus nihil est, aut aliquod esse reale in se habet. . . . Et similiter non creasset Deus omnia ex nihilo, sed ex uno esse transmutasset illa ad aliud esse" (*ibid.*, 2, 3; 230a). Cf.: ". . . quod est simpliciter et omnino nihil, non potest vere et realiter esse aliquid in aliqua ratione veri entis" (*ibid.*, 4; 230b).

[54]*Ibid.*, 2, 6-11; 230b-32b. Cf.: ". . . non requirit in illis aliquod esse reale, ut terminent hujusmodi scientiam, sed sufficit esse potentiale, quod ut sic solum est actu in causa . . ." (*ibid.*, 7; 231a). ". . . ab aeterno non fuisse veritatem in illis propositionibus, nisi quatenus erant objective in mente divina, quia subjective seu realiter non erant in se, neque objective in alio intellectu" (*ibid.*, 8; 231b).

[55]Cf. texts *supra*, nn. 23 and 50.

[56]". . . in rebus creatis ens in potentia et in actu immediate ac formaliter distinqui tanquam ens et non ens simpliciter. Quae distinctio ab aliquibus vocatur realis negativa, quia unum extremum est vera res, et non aliud; ab aliis vero vocatur distinctio rationis, quia non sunt duae res, sed una tantum, quae per intellectum concipitur, et comparatur ac si essent duae" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 3, 1; Vives, XXVI, 233a). Suarez later makes these two designations for the distinction his own (cf. text *infra*, n. 97).

[57]". . . illud esse in potentia, seu illa potentia objectiva non possit esse res aliqua vera et positiva in ipsa re, quae in potentia esse dicitur . . . hoc esse in potentia objectiva nullam dicit potentiam realem et positivam, quae actu sit. . . . Tertio, supra ostensum est, in essentia possibili priusquam fiat, nihil rei esse (proprie loquendo de re positiva et actuali); ergo non potest in ea esse potentia realis positiva; omnis enim potentia realis positiva, est res aliqua vera, seu in aliqua realitate et entitate fundata" (*ibid.*, 3, 3; 233b).

[58]"Si vero illa potentia manet in re producta, jam illa potentia non est objectiva tantum, sed etiam subjectiva, nec res fierent ex nihilo, sed ex praesupposita potentia, tanquam ex subjecto, vel materia ex qua fit res" (*ibid.*). "Neque illa potentia respectu cujus dicuntur esse in potentia objectiva, potest esse aliquid in ipsis, sed in causa a qua fieri possunt, quia esse in potentia objectiva, nihil aliud est quam posse objici alicui potentiae . . . dicitur ergo esse in potentia objectiva in ordine ad alterius potentiam, et per denominationem ab illa dicitur res possibilis" (*ibid.*, 4; 233-234). ". . . cum res creatur, desinit esse in potentia, non quia desinat esse subjecta divinae potentiae, et contenta in illa, sed quia jam non est tantum in illa, sed etiam ab illa, et in seipsa. Hunc ergo statum excludebat illud in potentia" (*ibid.*; 234a).

This metaphysical conception of the non-reality of the merely possible cannot avoid running into insuperable difficulties in explaining how the same thing can acquire both cognitional and real being. Suarez can propose only a negative identity which is represented by human cognition after the manner of a positive identity. "Cum ergo dicitur res possibilis, et facta, esse eadem numero vel specie, si sit sermo de identitate reali, seu positiva, falsum est, quia haec non est nisi inter extrema positiva et realia; negative autem dicuntur esse una res, vel unius speciei, quia res producibilis et producta non sunt duae res, sed una, neque habent duas species, aut duas essentias, sed unam; haec autem unitas seu identitas negativa apprehenditur a nobis ad modum positivae, quia comparamus rem positivam objective existentem in intellectu ad rem actu existentem,

apart from its being placed in existence by God, it cannot have any real being.[52] The objections against this doctrine are unimportant and arise in general from the notion that the possibles have their own objective truth, with all truth founded on being. Such objections are easily answered by showing that the essences have this truth only insofar as they are in some intellect and not because of any real actual being in themselves.[53]

The force of the term "objective" is clear enough from this explanation. It denotes the essence as an object of the intellect or of a productive faculty. This status of the essence as merely an object of intellectual consideration but without actual existence in reality Suarez calls essential *being;* not actual essential being, but potential or possible essential being. Such being is cognitional being or a being of reason,[54] as distinguished from real being. Though it is called essential *being* (*esse*), it is not *a* being (*ens*). In this doctrine, evidently, *being* (*esse*) is not sufficient in itself to constitute anything *a* being (*ens*). On the other hand, Suarez would require that the essential and existential constituent of a real thing be each in itself *a* being (*ens*). He does not allow any place for a metaphysics in which neither the essence nor the existence of a creature is in any proper sense *a* being.

The next step in the Suarezian procedure is to show that potential essential being and actual essential being differ simply as a nonbeing and a being (*tanquam ens et non ens simpliciter*). Such a distinction, Suarez reports, is called by some a real negative distinction, because one of its terms is not truly a thing; while by others it is named a distinction of reason because in it the one thing concerned is conceived by the intellect as though there were two things involved. Suarez, to judge by the way he writes, accepts both ways of characterizing the one and the same distinction.[55]

The distinction is readily established. The potential being, or objective potency, which constitutes potential essence, cannot, as has just been shown, be any true and positive reality (*res*) in the thing itself (*in ipsa re*). Therefore it does not denote any real and positive potency, which would of course be actual.[56] It does not remain in a thing once the thing is produced in reality.[57] Such potential being,

therefore, does not denote the positive mode or status of a being.[58] Essence in this potential state has no entity at all. It cannot with propriety be conceived as the potency to which the existence is declared to be added in order to constitute a being or an actual essence (*ens aut essentiam in actu*). For how could an act be impressed upon that which is nothing?[59]

Possible essential being is therefore *not* the *receptive* potency of existence. It is distinguished from actual essential being because it is in itself a nonbeing. In other words, though called being (*esse*), it is simply nothing. A receptive or subjective potency, on the contrary, is, according to these texts, something which in itself is real, positive, and actual, something which is truly a thing. As the matter or subject of an act, it has all these characteristics, characteristics which are excluded from objective potency. The objective potency therefore is not the potency which receives existence. It cannot be the subject of

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ac si essent duo extrema positiva, cum tamen reipsa non sint nisi unum. . . ." (*ibid.*, 2, 9; 232a). The thing which is known, accordingly, is not the same positive reality which actually exists. Such a doctrine could hardly help developing into the Cartesian separation of ideas from things.

[58]"Relinquitur ergo, ens in potentia ut sic, non dicere statum aut modum positivum entis, sed potius praeter denominationem a potentia agentis includere negationem, scilicet, quod nondum actu prodierit a tali potentia . . ." (*ibid.*, 3, 4; 234a). The inclusion of the negation in the concept of potential being is here explicit.

[59]"Nam, si sit sermo de essentia in actu respectu essentiae in potentia, minus proprie dici videtur addere illi existentiam, quia additio realis non fit proprie, nisi enti reali, nam aliquid entitatis habet cui additio fit; diximus autem essentiam in potentia nihil habere entitatis . . . quo modo enim potest actu imprimi ei quod nihil est?" (*ibid.*, 3, 5; 234ab). Cf. text *supra*, n. 4.

[60]"Ex hoc tamen necessario sequitur, quamvis essentia actualis non differat a potentiali nisi dum est, vel etiam quia est sub actu essendi, formaliter tamen ac praecise non differre immediate in actu essendi, sed in sua entitate essentiali, seu in esse essentiae actualis. . . . sed essentia actualis in esse essentiae differt ab essentia in potentia, ut per se notum est, et non differt formaliter ac praecise per existentiam, sed per actualitatem illam quam in se habet, ab existentia distinctam, quia illam actu non habebat dum erat in potentia . . ." (*ibid.*, 3, 6; 234b). "Et consequenter etiam est verum, essentiam, prout actuale ens, distingui immediate ab essentia potentiali per suammet entitatem actualem, sive ad habendam illam requirat aliam entitatem, vel alium modum, sive non . . ." (*ibid.*, 8; 235a).

[61]"Unde, ut formaliter loquamur, et abstrahamus ab omni opinione, non est dicendum, essentiam actualem distingui a potentiali, quia habet existentiam; nam . . . formalissime et immediate in omni sententia separatur essentia actualis a potentiali, per suammet entitatem actualem, quam habet in ratione essentiae realis" (*ibid.*).

[62]". . . ergo esse essentiae actualis non distinguitur ex natura rei ab actuali essentia, alioqui in infinitum procederetur; ergo in omni opinione illud esse, quo constituitur essentia actualis, ut sic, non potest esse distinctum ex natura rei ab ipsa" (*ibid.*, 4, 3; 235b).

existential act. The objective potency is not found in the things themselves but in the faculty of which it is the object. As such it expressly includes a negation. It is the possibility of a thing *not* yet produced. Accordingly it cannot be really and positively identified with anything in the actually existing thing.

Actual essential being, on the other hand, is an actual entity. It differs from potential essence, therefore, formally and precisely, by the actuality which it has in itself and which in this problem is contrasted with existence. The difference lies within the order of essence. This, Suarez considers, is immediately evident in itself.[60] No matter what opinion one follows in the general problem, one has to say that, formally and immediately, actual essence is distinguished from potential essence, not because it has existence, but by its own actual entity which it has in its status of real essence.[61] This actual entity is real being, being which does not enter into composition with it but is in every way identical with it in reality, as every opinion, Suarez claims, must admit. Any real distinction here would give rise to an infinite regress.[62] The proper entity of actual essence, entity which is entirely in the line of essence as essence is distinguished from existence, is accordingly what constitutes essential being a *thing* or a *reality* and so makes it the first term of the distinction between essence and being.

One may well pause here and ask just what is involved in this doctrine. To judge from the care with which Suarez develops it, it seems to be the crucial point in the whole problem. If the centuries-old controversy concerns a distinction between two realities (*res*) and if actual essential entity is what constitutes essential being a reality, certainly the whole issue centers around the question of what makes the created essence actual, in the most basic and formal sense.

First, Suarez quite evidently has not the slightest notion that there ever existed historically a doctrine which placed the real distinction between the essence itself and the first basic actuality of that essence. He is not aware that any metaphysics has ever shown that the finite essence is really different from its being, whether such being be called essential or existential. He is not interested in a problem in which every aspect of being remains firmly on the "existence" side of the distinction and in which the first term, essence, of itself contains no

being of any kind whatever. Rather, Suarez remains within the framework of a controversy in which both terms are represented as of themselves containing being. Both are represented as actual, and so both are understood as realities. Suarez is evidently opposing a doctrine which, as in Giles of Rome,[63] presumes that the essence has its own actuality but that such essential actuality is not sufficient in itself to make the essence exist. The point at issue is whether these two terms are in reality the same kind of being (*esse*), the same actuality, the same reality (*res*), or whether they are outside the mind two different kinds of being, two different actualities, two different realities.

[63]". . . illa tamen actualitas quam importat essentia non est tanta quod sufficiat ad hoc quod essentia existat . . ." (*Theoremata*, v; ed. Hocedez, p. 21, ll. 12-14). "Dicemus ergo quod essentia angeli non est tantae actualitatis quod possit actu existere nisi a Primo agente detur ei actualitas aliqua essentiam ipsam complens et perficiens, quae actualitas communi nomine dicitur esse" (*ibid.*, xix; p. 130, ll. 8-11).

[64]". . . formaliter tamen et intrinsece non differt existentia actualis a seipsa potentiali per essentiam, sed per suam actualem entitatem, quam actu non habebat, dum erat in potentia . . ." (*Dis. Metaphys.*, xxxi, 3, 7; Vives, xxvi, 235a). "Cumque ipsamet entitas existentiae possit esse interdum in potentia, interdum in actu, et consequenter etiam de illa necesse sit fateri, non esse de essentia ejus actu existere, neque actu constituere rem existentem. . . ." (*ibid.*, 6, 7; 244a). ". . . esse et non esse extra causas commune est essentiae et existentiae . . ." (*ibid.*, 21; 249a). Suarez's ultimate identification of potential essence with potential existence has to be taken as paralleling his identification of real essence and real existence. ". . . proportione servata, idem omnino esse existentiam in potentia cum essentia in potentia, et existentiam in actu cum essentia in actu" (*ibid.*, 249b). Cf.: "Suarez spricht . . . selbst von einer möglichen Existenz im Gegensatz zu möglichen Wesenheiten" (M. Rast, "Die Possiblienlehre des Franz Suarez," *Scholastik*, x [1935], 342).

Suarez acknowledges that "existence" in the strict sense of the word denotes only actuality, but in his own usage extends it also to the potential sense. "Haec enim vox, *existentia*, in rigore non significat existentiam (ut aiunt) in actu signato, seu ut conceptum et in potentia tantum . . . sed significat illam solum in actu exercito, seu ut actualem . . . Si vero nomen existentiae extendatur ad eam, quae est tantum in potentia seu objective . . ." (*Dis. Metaphys.*, xxxi, 6, 21; Vives, xxvi, 249b).

[65]"Similiter, non solum essentia praecise, et existentia praecise, sed etiam totum compositum ex esse et essentia, potest a nobis concipi, ut in potentia, et in actu, ut per se notum est; hoc autem ens in actu non distinguitcr adaequate a seipso in potentia, quia addit existentiam essentiae; nam in utroque statu includit existentiam proportionate . . ." (*ibid.*, 3, 7; 235a).

[66]For example, Henry of Ghent (cf. text *supra*, n. 17). Capreolus: ". . . essentia creaturae non est realiter ipsum suum esse actualis existentiae" (*Defensiones, In* I *Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1; ed. Paban-Pégues, I, 311). Cajetan: ". . . an esse actualis existentiae et essentia distinguantur realiter" (*In De Ente et Essentia*, cap. 5; ed. H. H. Laurent, p. 153 no. 97). In St. Thomas Aquinas this situation could hardly arise, since there is no higher act than being: ". . . esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum" (*De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2 ad 9; Mandonnet, II, 254a). ". . . esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae" (*ST*, I, q. 3, a. 4).

[67]Cf. texts *supra*, nn. 52 and 57.

Such is the way in which the problem appears, without any doubt at all, after the foregoing Suarezian treatment of the actual entity of essence.

Secondly, "being" (*esse*) is only too evidently looked upon as something that can be either actual or potential. It is not regarded as of its very nature the actuality of all actualities. Rather, essential *being* can be considered as merely potential. Similarly, the other term of the distinction, "existence," taken just by itself, can be either potential or actual.[64] In accordance with this doctrine, the composite of the two when represented as in potency is conceived as having existence, though the merely potential kind which is different from actual existence.[65] Little wonder, then, that Suarez, like his predecessors in the controversy,[66] has to insist on the notion of *actual* existential being! Even existential being, let alone the more general notion which extends to both essential and existential being, does not *of itself* denote any actuality! The extreme bearing of the conception of existence as a "thing" (*res*) becomes evident from these considerations. A sensible thing may be conceived as either actually or potentially existent. So also can existence itself, as contrasted with essence, be looked upon as either actual or potential!

Thirdly, just what is an essence which is not a receptive potency for existence? Potential essential being is expressly, in this doctrine, not a receptive potency. It can function as the object of a faculty, but as such it cannot receive existence. It is not the subject which actually exists. If it were, creation would be impossible, for the subject would be presupposed to the creative act.[67]

Is not all this an attempt to submit both the medieval notions of essence and being to an over-all doctrine of act and potency? What constitutes a being is expressed by "actuality" and not by "existence" or "being." Created existence, in fact, can be conceived as potential and so as an existence which is a nonbeing. Potential existence is here not presented as essence, nor is it understood as constituted by anything in the line of essence. Under the aspect of existence it can be merely potential. Existence, moreover, is constituted a being by its *actual* entity, entity which it did not have when it was in potency. It is not existence, then, which formally makes the difference between a being

and a nonbeing, but rather actuality, which forms a notion common to both essence and existence.[68] On the other hand a potential essence, which is in itself actually a nothing, cannot be the subject of actual existence. It cannot receive actual existential being, for a nothing cannot receive an act. The essence which actually exists, accordingly, is conceived as a reality, a thing, an actual being, in its own right, and so as distinct *within the order of essence* from the objective potency which never does actually exist. Just as a thing like a tree or a stone can be conceived as a nonbeing before it existed and as a being when it exists, so essence and existence can each be conceived as potential and as actual. It is the proper actuality of each in its own respective order that formally constitutes the difference in all cases between a being and a nonbeing. Such is the full force of the Suarezian conception of essence and existence as things or realities (*res*). Essence is no longer simply a potency to being, and existence is no longer of its very nature actual. Like any other "things," these two, each entirely within its own order, can be considered either as actual or as potential.

Finally, from these tenets there emerges the answer to the puzzling question of how Suarez can say that potential essential *being* is in itself entirely nothing. It is being (*esse*) and yet is *a* nonbeing (*ens*). The answer is that for Suarez being (*esse*) is not what constitutes the essence a being. What constitutes it a being is actuality. Consequent-

[68]Cf. texts *supra*, n. 64. "That is why it is a mistake to treat the problem of essence and existence as an instance of a more general distinction of potency and act . . ." (D. J. B. Hawkins, *Being and Becoming* [New York: Sheed and Ward, 1954], p. 105).

[69]"Imo, si consequenter loquantur, non video qua ratione possint eam admittere" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 4, 4; Vives, XXVI, 236a). Suarez can form no notion of an actually existent essence which has *all* its actuality from an act which is other than itself.

[70]"Dico tertio: illud esse, quo essentia creaturae formaliter constituitur in actualitate essentiae, est verum existentiae. . . . Primo, quia hoc esse praecise sumptum satis est ad veritatem hujus locutionis de secundo adjacente, *Essentia est;* ergo illud esse est vera existentia. . . . Secundo . . . nam huic esse actualis essentiae conveniunt omnia quae tribui solent existentiae . . . ergo est verum esse existentiae. . . . primo hoc esse essentiae actualis non est aeternum, sed temporale . . . Deinde, hoc esse convenit creaturae contingenter. . . . Est ergo hoc verum esse existentiae. Tertio declaratur hoc ipsum ex propria ratione existentiae; nam esse existentiae nihil aliud est quam illud esse, quo formaliter et immediate entitas aliqua constituitur extra causas suas, et desinit esse nihil, ac incipit esse aliquid; sed hujusmodi est hoc esse, quo formaliter et immediate constituitur res in actualitate essentiae; ergo est verum esse existentiae" (*ibid.*, 4, 4-6; 235b-36b).

[71]Cf. text *supra*, n. 55.

ly, when Suarez states that essence just in itself and as potential is altogether nothing, he is not at all implying that as such it is devoid of being (*esse*). It is still essential *being*.

V. The Terms Which Are Really Identical

With the terms of the problem established unambiguously as realities (*res*), each of which may be in itself considered either as actual or as potential, and with the criterion of actuality accepted as the formally constitutive mark of *a* being, Suarez has little trouble in showing that actual essential being is truly existential being. He even admits that he cannot see how any one who asserts a real distinction can consistently maintain that the being which formally makes the essence actual is existential being![68] He argues simply and straightforwardly. First, actual essential being, precisely in itself, suffices for the truth of the statement "The essence is"; such being, therefore, is true existence, for "is" in such a case, according to the common conception of mankind, means temporal and actual being in reality, which everyone understands as existence or existential being. Secondly, actual essential being has all the characteristics which are usually attributed to existence, including temporality and contingence, for creatures have no eternally actual and real being but only eternal potential being; therefore their actual essential being is true existential being. Finally, to start with the notion of existence, existential being is that kind of being by which any entity is constituted, formally and immediately, outside its causes and outside nothingness; but that is just what actual essential being does; therefore actual essential being is true existential being.[70]

The probative force of each of these three arguments lies in the notion that the constitutive of a being is actuality as such, the notion which has already been so carefully explained. In the first argument, this conception shows that actual essential being, precisely as such, makes the essence *a* being and distinguishes it from a potential being; and, as Suarez had shown,[71] an actual being and a potential being are formally and immediately distinguished as a being and a nonbeing. In the second argument, the actual essential being of creatures is

established as temporal and contingent, in contradistinction to their potential essential being; so this actuality, considered entirely in the line of essence, is what makes a thing exist; in other words, it is what formally constitutes as a being what previously was nothing. In the third and final argument, an actual being is shown to be the same as an existent being, on account of the immediate and formal opposition which has been established between actual being and potential being; and since actual essential being constitutes the essence as actual, it thereby constitutes it as existent.

Given their starting-points, these arguments are flawless. They show

[73]"Item ex immediata et formali oppositione supra declarata inter ens actu, et ens in potentia . . . ergo illud esse, quo formaliter constituitur ens actu in se et extra causas, est etiam esse quo constituitur existens; ergo illud esse est verum esse existentiae" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, xxxi, 4, 6; Vives, xxvi, 237a). "Non est ergo in una re nisi unum esse quo constituitur ens actu, et illud ipsum est esse existentiae" (*ibid.*, 5, 15; 241b).

In the authentic texts of St. Thomas Aquinas, there is nothing against identifying existence, both really and conceptually, with the being which formally and immediately makes the essence actual, though of course there would be serious objection to calling that existence, considered just in itself, a reality. On this latter point, cf.: "For there is only one thing (*res*), composed though it may be on the metaphysical level of principles of being and of limitation." (Hawkins, *Being and Becoming*, p. 44).

[74]"Dicendum est enim primo, essentiam creatam in actu extra causas constitutam non distingui realiter ab existentia, ita ut sint duae res seu entitates distinctae" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, xxxi, 6, 1; Vives, xxvi, 241b).

[75]". . . ubique ait ens adjunctum rebus nihil eis addere; . . . nihil addit rei seu essentiae actuali, ex sententia Aristotelis . . . " (*ibid.*; 242a).

[76]". . . talis entitas, addita actuali essentiae, nec potest illi formaliter conferre primam (ut ita dicam) actualitatem seu primam rationem entis in actu, qua separatur et distinguitur ab ente in potentia; neque etiam potest esse necessaria . . ." (*ibid.*, 2).

[77]"Et hinc satis etiam constat, hujusmodi entitatem vel modum esse superfluum. . . . Non enim esse potest, ut essentia fiat ens actuale, et extra causas constituatur; hoc enim formaliter habet per esse essentiae actuale, ut saepe probavimus. . . " (*ibid.*, 5, 11; 240a). "Sic ergo aperte constat, entitatem existentiae distinctam ab entitate essentiae non posse requiri ut intrinsece constituat ipsam entitatem essentiae in sua propria actualitate" (*ibid.*, 6, 3; 242b).

[78]"Atque hinc ulterius inferimus, hujusmodi entitatem existentiae dicto modo distinctam, non solum superfluam esse, sed plane impossibilem. . . . hic autem nullus est effectus formalis quem talis entitas dare possit" (*ibid.*, 5, 12; 240b). "Primum autem membrum partitionis positae, et admittitur ab omnibus auctoribus, etiam ab illis qui existentiam ab essentia realiter distinguunt; et est plane evidens ex ipsa fere terminorum declaratione, jam satis tradita in suppositionibus positis; repugnat enim entitatem constitui in esse entitatis per aliquid a se condistinctum" (*ibid.*, 6, 2; 242a).

[79]". . . concludimus, ens actu, et existens, eamdem rem et rationem formalem significare: ideoque fingi non posse esse existentiae, distinctum ab illo esse, quo unaquaeque res in actualitate suae essentiae constituitur" (*ibid.*, 5, 11; 240b).

[80]"Addimus vero ulterius, praeter hoc esse existentiae, nullum aliud esse necessarium ut res existat, quia ipsum esse intrinsecum et entitativum sufficit . . ." (*ibid.*, 6, 11; 245a).

clearly that essential being and existential being are the same reality, whether that reality be called actual essence or actual essential being or actual existential being. In the one real thing, therefore, there is only the one kind of being. This constitutes the thing an actual being, and itself is existential being.[73] Such is the conclusion which follows inevitably from the Suarezian understanding of the terms in this problem.

With the identity of essential being and existential being firmly established, Suarez can now confidently approach the noted historic controversy. He can decide, first, that created essence actually constituted outside its causes is not really distinct from existence, in such a way that they would be two distinct things or entities.[73] Such is the doctrine of Aristotle, who everywhere says that being adds nothing to things in the sense of actual essences.[74] It is especially shown by reason, for the first actuality of a thing constitutes the thing a being and distinguishes it from potential being. But this first actuality is the essence's own essential entity. Therefore any further entity to constitute it a being is both superfluous and impossible.[75] It is superfluous, for essence is already constituted a being outside its causes by its actual essential being, as has been shown so often.[76] It is impossible, because it would be contradictory for an entity to be constituted in entitative being by something distinct from itself.[77] Accordingly, an actual being and an existent signify the same thing and the *same formal aspect* (*rationem formalem*). It is therefore impossible to imagine any existential being distinct from the being by which a thing is constituted in the actuality of its essence.[78] In this reasoning, Suarez continues to assume as self-evident and accepted by all, even his opponents, that an entity cannot be constituted in its essential being by anything other than itself.

The same reasons which show that a real distinction between essence and existence is impossible prove likewise that a modal difference cannot be present. The reasons have demonstrated that nothing over and above the actuality of the essence is necessary to make a thing exist, nor could any addition to the essence possibly exercise that function. Such an added mode, just as in the case of an added entity, would be both superfluous[79] and impossible.[80] Again, the real

being by which the essence is first constituted an actual being is true existential being.[81]

The terms which Suarez finds to be really identical are consequently actual essence on the one hand and actual existence on the other. These, as described in the background of the centuries-old controversy, turn out to be one and the same reality (*res*). There is not the least doubt that *both* terms are here considered as *actual.* The only question that remains is whether the Suarezian arguments have not shown considerably more than just a *real* identity between actual essence and actual existence. If these two have been proven identical in their function and even in their formal aspect, how is any *conceptual* distinction between them at all possible?

VI. The Terms Which Are Conceptually Distinct

This brings the treatment to Suarez's own positive doctrine. Existence and essence, he maintains, may be distinguished in two ways. First, existence may be looked upon as denoting what is actual, and essence as designating what is potential (that is, in the objective sense). In that case, the distinction between them is the distinction of an actual being from a potential being (*tamquam ens in actu et in potentia*). Secondly, *both* existence and essence may be taken as *actual.* Here the only distinction between them is a distinction of reason with a basis in reality. This positive doctrine is sufficient to

[80]". . . ergo ut talis entitas est, non posset intrinsece constitui in tali entitate actuali per illum modum, seu per esse distinctum, . . . ergo non potest talis modus, ex natura rei distinctus, esse primum et intrinsecum esse reale constituens actualem entitatem ipsius essentiae . . ." (*ibid.*, 6, 9; 244b).

[81]"Rursus ostendimus, hoc ipsum esse reale, quo essentia primo constituitur ens actu, esse verum esse existentiae . . ." (*ibid.*, 11; 245a).

[82]"Dico tertio, in creaturis existentiam et essentiam distingui, aut tanquam ens in actu et in potentia, aut si utraque actu sumatur, solum distingui ratione cum aliquo fundamento in re, quae distinctio satis erit ut absolute dicamus, non esse de essentia creaturae actu existere" (*ibid.*, 13; 246a).

[83]Cf. texts *supra*, n. 55, and *infra*, n. 97.

[84]". . . imperfectio talis entitatis, quae non habet ex se necessitatem, ut sit id quod est, sed solum id habet ex influxu alterius.

"Atque hinc ulterius fit, ut intellectus noster, qui potest praescindere ea quae in re non sunt separata, possit etiam creaturas concipere abstrahendo illas ab actuali existentia, quia, cum non necessario existant, non repugnat concipere earum naturas praescindendo ab efficientia, et consequenter ab actuali existentia. Dum autem sic abstrahuntur, etiam praescinduntur ab actuali entitate essentiae . . ." (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 6, 14-15; Vives, XXVI, 246b). On this identification of abstraction and precision, cf. *supra*, n. 21.

justify the absolute assertion that actually to exist is not of a creature's essence.[82]

Suarez, accordingly, is asserting *two* different conceptual distinctions between essence and existence. The first is the conceptual distinction or negative real distinction[83] between a being in act and a being in potency. In this distinction essence is taken as potential, existence as actual. Since Suarez repeatedly contends that both existence and essence may be taken as either actual or potential, he is quite justified within the limits of his own metaphysics in taking for any particular case either one as potential and the other as actual. All that need be noted is that this first Suarezian conceptual distinction is explicitly the distinction between *potential* essence and *actual* existence. It is admittedly not a distinction between the concepts of the same terms whose real identity was established, actual essential being and actual existential being.

The second Suarezian conceptual distinction, however, purports to be that of actual essence from actual existence. It claims to be a conceptual distinction with a basis in reality. That real basis is the imperfection of the essence of a creature which of its own very nature cannot actually exist without the efficient causality of another. Hence the intellect by prescinding is able to conceive creatures in abstraction from that efficient causality and so from actual existence. Though the intellect is thereby prescinding from all actuality, *essential* as well as existential, it is nevertheless conceiving essence in such a way that all the essential predicates are affirmed of it, even though actual entity and actual existence are denied it.[84]

But what notion of essence does this basis in reality give to the first term of a conceptual distinction? Definitely it is not actual essence. It *prescinds* from the actual entity of the essence as well as from actual existence. It excludes from its content actual entity, essential as well as existential. The essence is conceived after the manner of the first constitutive of the thing, which can form an *object* of intellectual conception while prescinding from all actuality. The content of this concept is quite apparently given the status of potential being, for it is made that of something to which actual entity cannot belong as such, is described in terms which give it an objective or cognitional status,

and is found to be impossible in the case of God since the divine essence cannot be conceived after the manner of a potential being.[85]

On the strength of this description there can hardly be any doubt that the first term of the Suarezian conceptual distinction is not actual essence and so is definitely not the first term that was involved in the Suarezian assertion of the real identity of essence and being. Actual

[85]". . . praescindendo ab actuali entitate, aliquid consideretur tanquam omnino intrinsecum et necessarium, et quasi primum constitutivum illius rei, quae tali conceptioni objicitur; et hoc vocamus essentiam rei . . . ipsum actu existere . . . de facto potest non convenire creaturae prout tali conceptui objicitur. Quae omnia secus contingunt in Deo, quia, cum sit ens ex se necessarium concipi non potest per modum entis potentialis, sed actualis tantum . . ." (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 6, 15; Vives, XXVI, 246-47).

[86]". . . non potest actualis entitas ab existentia praescindi, ut supra probatum est (*ibid.*; 246b). Cf.: "Atque ad vim hujus rationis, sola praecisio per nostros conceptus sufficit; nam, hoc ipso quod intelligimus entitatem essentiae actualis, factam a Deo, etiamsi non intelligamus illi esse additam aliam entitatem, sufficienter concipimus illam existentem, neque in hoc conceptu objectivo aliquid falsum, aut sibi repugnans includimus . . ." (*ibid.*, 8; 244a). ". . . atque ita omne esse actuale, quo essentia in actu separatur ab essentia in potentia, dicetur non esse de essentia creaturae . . ." (*ibid.*, 14; 246b).

Actual essence and existence are, in fact, described as the same type of actual being. ". . . tunc actualis entitas essentiae habet proprium et intrinsecum esse actuale, quo est in rerum natura, et extra causas suas. Quid autem aliud est existere, quam ita esse?" (*ibid.*, 4; 243a). The only distinction involved here is that between actual essence and potential essence. It cannot for Suarez be conceived as though one term were the concept of actuality plus essence and the other term, existence, the concept of actuality minus essence; for essence as conceived without actuality, when contrasted with its actuality, becomes for him objective potency, which cannot properly be conceived as entering into composition with its actuality. The distinction, accordingly, remains that between actual essence and potential essence. ". . . additio realis non fit proprie, nisi enti reali, nam aliquid entitatis habet cui additio fit; diximus autem essentiam in potentia nihil habere entitatis; non ergo ei fit additio proprie loquendo, nisi fortasse secundum rationem, quatenus essentia in potentia objectiva apprehenditur per modum entis, propriusque diceretur essentiam, ut actu ens, distingui per existentiam actualem a seipsa, ut est in potentia" (*ibid.*, 4, 5; 234a). Existence and essence are the same *thing*, conceived now as actual, now as potential (cf. text *infra*, n. 90).

[87]". . . vel loquitur de essentia actuali, seu quae includat veram realitatem essentiae, vel de essentia potentiali. Priori modo plusquam falsum esset dicere, essentiam creaturae non esse a Deo, ut a causa efficiente, ut supra probatum est" (*ibid.*, 6, 17; 247b).

[88]Cf. text *supra*, n. 84.

[89]". . . nos distinguimus saltem ratione inter essentiam et existentiam, tanquam inter duo extrema positiva et realia. Dices, concipi quidem illa extrema tanquam positiva et realia, non tamen ut actualia, sed abstrahendo in ea latitudine, in qua ens abstrahit ab ente in actu et in potentia. Sed contra hoc est, quia essentiam sub propria ratione essentiae, non tantum ut potentialem, sed etiam ut actualem concipimus, et sic etiam illam ratione distinguimus ab existentia. Cum enim dicimus rem habere in actu suam essentiam et suam existentiam, non idem bis dicimus; non ergo sunt illae voces synonymae; ergo significata earum saltem ratione distinguuntur . . ." (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 6, 22; Vives, XXVI, 249b).

essential entity, in fact, cannot be prescinded from existence, as Suarez says his arguments have proved.[86] The concept of the actual entity contained in actual essence, therefore, merges in the concept of actual existence and belongs to the *concept* of the *second* term in this conceptual distinction. The distinction is definitely a distinction between a concept of essence which prescinds from essential actuality and a concept which contains both essential and existential actuality. The prescinding line falls between the essence and the actuality of that essence.

Suarez, accordingly, rejects the explanation of Henry of Ghent, which distinguished essence and existence on the ground that essence as such has no reference to the efficient causality of God, whereas existence has such a reference. Suarez cannot subscribe to this doctrine, because actual essence does contain exactly that reference to the divine causality, as he has already shown.[87] The actuality of the essence, therefore, is consistently related to the efficient causality which produces the actual existence; and so the abstraction from such efficient causality is necessarily abstraction from the actuality of the essence. All intrinsic actuality in the essence, consequently, is shifted from the concept of essence as the first term of the Suarezian conceptual distinction to the concept of the second term, for the concept of the first term here expressly prescinds from that efficient causality.[88]

The first term of Suarez's conceptual distinction here is evidently not, in the light of these explanations, the concept of actual essence. Is it then the concept of potential essence, just as it was in the first of his two conceptual distinctions? Suarez has maintained that in making his second distinction he is taking *both* essence and existence in act. Conscious of a furtive difficulty, he admits that if "existence" is taken in its strict sense of exercised act, the only distinction between essence and existence is that of a potential being from an actual being. Yet he insists again that, according to the true notion of existence which extends from exercised to signified existence, his present distinction is not between actual existence and merely potential essence nor between terms which abstract from actuality and potentiality but between actual existence and actual essence.[89] Expressly, then, Suarez continues to assert that the essence which is now conceptually distinct from

actual existence is neither that of potential essence nor that of essence in abstraction from both actuality and potentiality but definitely that of essence as actual.

How can this stand be reconciled with his doctrine as just sketched, which maintained that the essence which is here conceptually distinct from actual existence abstracts and prescinds from all actual essential entity? Suarez endeavors to explain it by examining more closely the two concepts of essence and existence. They denote the same reality (*res*). That reality is conceived as essence when it is described by its quidditative predicates. The same reality, on the other hand, is conceived under the aspect of existence when it is expressed as being in reality and outside its causes. Since actual entity does not follow from the essence itself, the *reception* of such entity means that something is now being conceived in it which is for it the formal aspect of being outside its causes and so is a different conception and description of the one identical reality and therefore suffices for a conceptual distinction.[90]

True, one has here two different descriptions and concepts of the same thing. This is amply sufficient for a conceptual distinction. But what notion of essence forms the first term of this conceptual distinction? The aspect of actual entity outside causes is precisely what distinguishes the second concept, that of existence, from the first, that of essence. The aspect of actual essential entity expressly does not belong to the first concept but only to the second. The difference in the concepts lies in the lack of actual entity in the content of the first and the inclusion of actual entity in the content of the second.

[90]"Dicendum ergo est, eamden rem esse essentiam et existentiam, concipi autem sub ratione essentiae, quatenus ratione ejus constituitur res sub tali genere et specie. . . . At vero haec eadem res concipitur sub ratione existentiae, quatenus est ratio essendi in rerum natura et extra causas. Nam quia essentia creaturae non hoc necessario habet ex vi sua ut sit actualis entitas, ideo quando recipit entitatem suam, concipimus aliquid esse in ipsa, quod sit illi formalis ratio essendi extra causas; et illud sub tali ratione appellamus existentiam, quod licet in re non sit aliud ab ipsamet entitate essentiae, sub diversa tamen ratione et descriptione a nobis concipitur, quod ad distinctionem rationis sufficit" (*ibid.*, 23; 250a).

[91]Cf.: ". . . est enim actualitas illa transcendens, et participatur non solum ab actu formali, sed etiam a potentia receptiva, cujus entitativa actualitas . . ." (*ibid.*, 5, 15; 241b). Cf. also texts *supra*, nn. 56-59.

[92]"Hujus autem distinctionis fundamentum est, quod res creatae de se non habent esse, et possunt interdum non esse. Ex hoc enim fit ut essentiam creaturae nos concipiamus, ut indifferentem ad esse vel non esse actu, quae indifferentia non est per modum abstractionis negativae, sed praecisivae; et ideo quamvis ratio essentiae absolute concipiatur a nobis etiam in ente in potentia, tamen multa magis intel-

Once more, the essence which is the first term of the Suarezian conceptual distinction is not conceived as actual essence. It is a term different from what was previously found to be really identical with existence. The concept of the actual essential entity considered as received by it is precisely the concept of actual existence.

The first term of this conceptual distinction, accordingly, is still not actual essence. What is it, then? Is it potential essence, or is it the common notion of essence which abstracts from both potentiality and actuality? Both these latter acceptations have been explicitly set aside by Suarez. He does not wish either. He insists that the first term of his own distinction is here *actual* essence. Yet everything noted so far in his description of this first term characterizes it as nonactual. So it should be either potential essence or else essence in abstraction from both actuality and potentiality. The only hint that Suarez is in fact somehow conceiving it as actual essence is his remark that it *receives* its entity. Potential essence, in the Suarezian doctrine, cannot receive actual existence; it is not a subjective or receptive potency. An essence represented as a receptive potency could, for Suarez, be conceived only as an actual essence.[91]

Can Suarez, then, make good a case for describing the first term of his conceptual distinction in ways that definitely exclude all notion of actuality from its intrinsic content and on the other hand maintain that it is conceived as a receptive potency for existence and so as something actual? He attempts to do this by examining the real basis for the distinction and the genesis of the two concepts as they emerge from that real foundation.

The real basis for distinguishing the two different concepts of essence and existence, he finds, is that created things do not have their being from themselves and are able not to be. On this foundation the essence of a creature is conceived as *indifferent* to actual being and nonbeing. This indifference to actual being and nonbeing is not merely a negative but rather a *precisive* abstraction. Essence so conceived is found both in potential essence and in actual essence, though of course in the latter case it *prescinds* from the actuality of being. Taken as found in an actual being, though prescinding from that actuality, Suarez claims, essence is conceived as potency, existence as its act.[92]

The concept which forms the first term of the Suarezian distinction, therefore, is now described as the concept of something indifferent in itself to actual and potential being. It is a concept whose content may be found in a potential being and also may be found in an actual being. It is conceived in precisive abstraction from both actual and potential being. Intrinsically, therefore, it does not contain the notion of actual essential being. Yet it is explicitly understood now by Suarez as potency to the act of existence, as the potency which has existence as its act. It is conceived as a subjective potency and so as something actual. The concept of essence as subjective potency is in Suarez's thought the concept of an actuality. In spite of what he has just said about the indifference of essence, as here considered, to actual being and nonbeing, the first term of the Suarezian distinction cannot be left as a sort of quasi-generic notion of essence which would have as its inferiors actual essence and potential essence nor as merely potential essence.[93]

But how can such a concept, whose intrinsic content prescinds from all actuality, be in any way considered a concept of actual essence? According to the Suarezian description of its genesis, it represents the indifferent quidditative content as abstracted not from a potential being but from an actual being. The intrinsic content of the concept prescinds from all actual essential being but is conceived nevertheless as retaining a reference to the actual being from which it was abstracted. From that actuality, now wholly external to its intrinsic content, it is denominated actual. By a sort of extrinsic denomination Suarez is able to call this concept the concept of actual essence for

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ligimus reperiri in ente in actu, licet in eo praescindamus totum id, quod necessario et essentialiter ei convenit, ab ipsa actualitate essendi; et hoc modo concipimus essentiam sub ratione essentiae, ut potentiam; existentiam vero ut actum ejus" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 6, 23; Vives, XXVI, 250a).

[93]Cf. *supra*, nn. 82 and 89.

[94]Cf. text *supra*, n. 92.

[95]Cf. *supra*, n. 25. The arbitrary construction of this new concept is apparent likewise from its casual connection with its basis in reality. The imperfection of a creature and the observation that a creature can receive something from another furnish the *occasion* for forming such a concept. "Hac ergo ratione dicimus hanc distinctionem rationis habere in re aliquod fundamentum, quod non est aliqua actualis distinctio quae in re intercedat, sed imperfectio creaturae, quae, hoc ipso quod ex se non habet esse, et aliud potest ab alio recipere, occasionem praebet huic nostrae conceptioni" (*Dis. Metaphys.*, XXXI, 6, 23; Vives, XXVI, 250a). That is, not its receiving existence, which for Suarez it cannot properly receive, but its receiving something else, provides the occasion for the new concept.

the purpose of conceiving it as receptive potency, while at the same time maintaining that it prescinds from all actual essential entity.

As far as its intrinsic content is concerned, therefore, the concept of essence which is here differentiated from the concept of actual existence is not at all the concept of actual essence as actual essence was understood in the question of real identity with existence. Rather, it is the concept of essence as indifferent to both potentiality and actuality. If it had been found in a potential being instead of in an actual being, it would have exactly the same intrinsic content.[94] Just as Suarez earlier in the *Discussion* had arbitrarily restricted the concept of essence in itself to that of potential essence, so now just as arbitrarily[95] he is distinguishing it from the concept of potential essence by the quite artificial addition of the factual reference to an actual being.

Similarly the notion of *receptive* potency seems added at least just as arbitrarily to the content of this concept of essence. There is nothing in the notion of the Suarezian essence as such to require the notion of receptive potency. Rather, the essence as such can be found in potential essence, which excludes the notion of receptive potency. Nor can the notion of receptive potency be drawn from the concept of actual essence, since actual essence is identical with the act which is being contradistinguished from that receptive potency. For Suarez the notion of actual existence needs no corresponding notion of a subjective potency into which it is received. Only some extrinsic motive to bring the concepts of existence and essence into the analogy of the Aristotelian form as act and matter as receptive potency could prompt such an arbitrary addition of the notion of receptive potency in the content of this further Suarezian concept of actual essence.

Suarez himself, however, gives no more detailed explanation of the nature of so amazing a concept. Instead, he centers his interest on showing that the doctrine which he defends is sufficient to state absolutely that actual existence is not of the essence of a creature. In this assertion the notion of a creature is not understood as that of real actual entity, for actual entity necessarily implies actual existence, and so actually to exist is included in the actual essence of a creature. When essence is taken in the sense of actual essence, therefore, it is of

the essence of a creature to exist.[96] However, in saying that actually to exist is not of a creature's essence, one is taking the creature as it abstracts or prescinds from both actual and possible creation. One has an objective concept of essence which abstracts from actual being or entity. In the concept of essence taken in this precision, no actual existence is contained. In this sense, accordingly, one says that actually to exist is not of the essence of a creature. But for this, the conceptual or negative real distinction between potential essence and actual essence suffices.[97]

This is Suarez's final word. It is not, then, a concept of actual essence which safeguards the notion of a creature. The concept of actual essence cannot help here, for it essentially involves actual existence. Rather, the concept has to be a concept of essence which prescinds from all essential actuality, in the sense that it includes no notion of actual entity or actual being in its content. Objectively conceived, such essence abstracts from potential as well as actual creation. As used here by Suarez, however, this indifferent essence now ultimaely appears, just as so often before, as potential essence. The distinction which Suarez uses to justify the notion of a creature is therefore finally located in only the first of the two distinctions which he defends between essence and existence in creatures—namely, the real negative or conceptual distinction between a potential being and an actual being. In this case the real (negative) distinction and the conceptual distinction fall between the same two terms. Even here there is no question of a conceptual distinction between terms that are not, in their own negative way, really distinct.

In *both* the Suarezian conceptual distinctions between essence and existence, accordingly, the distinction falls between the concept of actual existence and a concept of nonactual essence. In the first

[96]". . . in hac locutione nomine creaturae non est intelligenda realis entitas actualis seu acta creata; nam, si cum hac reduplicatione vel compositione fiat sermo, revera creatura essentialiter petit, actu existere, ut sit creatura. Atque in hoc sensu, sicut albedo est de essentia albi, ut album est, ita existentia est de essentia creaturae. . . ." (*ibid.*, 6, 24; 250ab).

[97]"Cum autem negatur esse de essentia creaturae actu existere, sumenda est creatura ut abstrahit seu praescindit a creatura creata et creabili, cujus essentia objective concepta abstrahit ab actuali esse aut entitate, et hoc modo negatur esse de essentia ejus actu existere, quia non clauditur in conceptu ejus essentiali sic praeciso. Ad quae omnia sufficit distinctio rationis, vel realis negativa, quae est inter essentiam potentialem et actualem" (*ibid.*; 250b).

conceptual distinction it is explicitly between the concept of potential essence and the concept of actual existence. In the second conceptual distinction, it lies in fact between the concept of actual existence and a concept of essence which is indifferent to actuality and potentiality in its intrinsic content but which is arbitrarily considered in extrinsic relation to an actual being though excluding all essential actuality in itself. In neither conceptual distinction are the terms which had been really identified the same terms which are now conceptually distinguished. Actual essence and actual existence were the terms which were found to be really identical, while *nonactual* essence—in the one case as potential, in the other case as indifferent—is the term which is conceptually distinguished from *actual* existence.

VII. Conclusions

Suarez, therefore, has not succeeded in finding a conceptual distinction between the same two terms whose identity he had satisfactorily established. Moreover, he does not even seem to have any interest at stake in the failure of his attempt to do so. He was keenly set on proving, according to the exigencies of his metaphysics, the real identity of essence and being. He was at least equally intent, in his Christian background, on maintaining that actually to exist is not of the essence of a creature. But for the latter tenet a conceptual distinction between *potential* essence and *actual* existence sufficed. That distinction was the only one *used* by Suarez for the purpose and so is the only distinction between essence and being which exercises any operational function in his metaphysical procedure.

Why, then, did Suarez bother to advance a second conceptual distinction, one meant to fall between actual essence and actual existence? It is a distinction which serves no purpose in the movement of his metaphysical reasoning. It is a distinction which gives no further insights into his doctrine of being. It is a distinction which has for its first term an artificially constructed concept consisting of the content of nonactual essence plus an arbitrary extrinsic and factual reference to an actual being and a still more arbitrary connotation of the actual entity that constitutes a receptive potency as Suarez inter-

prets the Aristotelian doctrine of matter and form. Certainly he gains no metaphysical advantage from this tactic. Can he at all be following a genuine metaphysical inspiration in proposing such a distinction? Is he in any way led to it through an original and personal contemplation of being?

The distinction hardly follows from a disinterested metaphysical scrutiny of the terms (*extrema*) involved. As its first term it uses a concept of actual essence which could scarcely arise from the mere consideration of essence and being in creatures. On the contrary, it has to make an artificially and arbitrarily constructed concept. Suarez must have some extrinsic motive for attempting such a construction. What motive can he have? The only indication in the structure of the thirty-first *Metaphysical Discussion* is that he was undertaking the defense of a position already drawn up in definitely articulated form through centuries of controversial litigation. The case was already constructed; the lawyer undertook to defend it as received. It called for the rejection of a real distinction and the defense of a conceptual distinction which would safeguard the doctrine of creation. It had traditionally taken for granted, without ever subjecting the point to judicial examination, that the conceptual distinction should fall between the same terms which were shown to be really identical.

Such is the case which Suarez undertook to defend. He made good his first point, showing incontestably that actual essential being and actual existential being are identical in reality. He likewise proved satisfactorily that a conceptual distinction between potential essence and actual existence safeguards the notion of a creature. Those were the two points at issue before the court. The further conceptual distinction between actual essence and actual existence served only to round out the symmetry of Suarez's presentation of the case and bring it into conformity with the traditional jurisprudence that had emerged from the long historic controversy and that formed the background in which the judges would give their decision. That second conceptual

[88]"Et imprimis nullus est Theologorum, qui distinctionem rationis inter essentiam et existentiam non admittat, quamvis non omnes eodem modo illam explicent" (*ibid.*, 6, 16; 247a). The nominalistic influence on Suarezian distinctions has been noted by critics; cf. C. Vollert's introduction to *On the Various Kinds of Distinctions* (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1947), p. 12. However, for the case against any basic nominalism in Suarez, cf. P. Descoqs, "Thomisme et suarézisme," *Archives de Philosophie*, IV (1926), 90-101.

distinction had no legal bearing on the two points at issue. That it introduced a concept of essence, which from a metaphysical viewpoint was a bizarre combination of the notion of essence in itself with the arbitrary external references to an actual being and to an analogy with the doctrine of matter as subjective potency, need hardly have been expected to enter into the consideration of the bench. That an essence so understood could be called "actual" only by an extrinsic denomination was of no special concern to the advocate. His client had been arraigned on a charge of excessive realism, not of nominalism. After a successful defense on that main issue, the only other interest was to forestall a possible charge of heresy which on the basis of past juridical practice might be expected as a countercharge against the rejection of a real distinction.

Both the legal points at issue before the court, then, were ably defended by Suarez. The attention of the judges was concentrated on those points only. Conceptual distinction was cited as something admitted by all theologians, though explained by them in various ways,[98] so that the particular way of explaining it could not have decisive importance for the issues legally involved. The introduction of the second Suarezian conceptual distinction made the case fit into the whole juridical pattern with which the judges were familiar. That it did so by extrinsically denominating "actual" a notion of nonactual essence was sufficient to satisfy the legal technicalities and could occasion no judicial scrutiny where a charge of nominalism had not been laid. Viewed after the manner of a legal process, the Suarezian procedure in the thirty-first *Discussion* makes excellent sense. Only from the standpoint of metaphysical penetration does it become confusing and pointless when it treats the conceptual distinction between actual essence and actual existence.

What the Suarezian *Discussion* accomplishes in an entirely convincing manner, however, is to show definitively that essential being and existential being cannot be distinguished in reality outside the mind. Earlier in the present century the Dominican Norbert del Prado, one of the most intransigent opponents of the Suarezian position in modern times, wrote that the arguments of Suarez include all that had been previously said and all that his successors have been able to

say on the subject.[99] At the time this tribute may have seemed a highly chivalrous gesture across the havoc of controversy. Today it rather damns with faint praise. Suarez has presented his arguments with such pitiless cogency that the case of the real identity of essential being and existential being should have been closed forever.[100] The Suarezian *Discussion* shows with incontestable rigor that when the terms of the problem are posed as essential being and existential being, both types of being really coincide.

By the same token, the Suarezian *Discussion* leaves entirely untouched the profound metaphysical doctrine contained in the Thomistic texts; namely, that the essence of a creature is other than either its real or its cognitional being.[101] This Thomistic distinction falls between the essence itself and the being which gives the essence its first and most basic and most intimate actuality. In the terms used by Suarez, it would lie not between essential being and existential being but between essential being and essence, leaving any further existential being just as superfluous and just as impossible as Suarez had shown it to be. But Suarez exhibits no knowledge that such a doctrine ever existed and no notion that it could even be possible. He shows no inclination whatsoever to get outside the narrow juridical limits in

[99]*De Veritate Fundamentali Philosophiae Christianae* (Fribourg, 1911), p. 152.

[100]Del Prado's (*De Veritate*, pp. 154-64) answers to the Suarezian arguments, for instance, carefully change the problem from that of the distinction between essential *being* and existence to that of the distinction between essence and *being*, as described in the texts of St. Thomas.

[101]Cf.: "Infatti che significato può avere la distinzione reale, se l'ente creato è costituito intrinsicamente dalla sola essenza, e l'esistenza vi ha semplicemente la parte di principio accidentale? Tale distinzione non tocca l'ente nella sua intima costituzione . . ." (I. Bonetti, *Divus Thomas* [Piacenza], LIV [1951], 367). There is of course nothing to prevent the word "Thomist" from being used in a number of different senses as far as doctrine is concerned. For Suarez, according to the usage of his times, it meant the school of thought represented by Capreolus, Cajetan, and so on. "Thomistic" is still used today in that sense; for example, in regard to a problem related to the present one: ". . . the Thomistic theory of personality . . . is completely in accord with St. Thomas' dicta," (T. U. Mullaney, "Created Personality: The Unity of Thomistic Tradition," *New Scholasticism*, XXIX [1955], 399). Concerning the question of existence, however, studies like those of E. Gilson, "Cajétan et l'existence," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, XV (1953), 267-286, and N. Wells (cf. *supra*, nn. 31 and 39) indicate that the doctrine of being found in these commentators is, from a purely metaphysical standpoint, radically different from that of St. Thomas.

[102]Cf.: "Non trascurò certamente le questioni metafisiche, tutt'altro; le studiò e le discusse con grande erudizione e passione; ma le vide attraverso la preoccupazione del concreto" (C. Giacon, *Suarez* [Brescia: Soc. ed. 'La Scuola', 1945], p. 111).

which his case had been cited[102] and no cognizance of any deeper metaphysical stratum on which the problem of essence and being could be investigated. In the present revival of interest in the metaphysical doctrine of St. Thomas, the case of Suarez is perhaps the best object lesson in what happens when the Thomistic essence is represented as any kind of essential *being* or even conceived as having some kind of proper being in its own right, whether such being is looked upon as real or as only intentional.

On the broader metaphysical panorama, however, the Suarezian *Discussion* provides an extremely interesting and profitable illustration of the difficulty, and finally the impossibility, of finding any content over and above essence in the notion of being, once a thing and its being have been considered identical in reality. Successful though Suarez has been in making his case against a real distinction between essential being and existential being, which was the comparatively superficial problem of his own day, he can hardly be said to have had corresponding success in regard to the more comprehensive question which interests present-day metaphysics. Suarez has not provided an instance of showing that one may deny a real distinction between a thing and its being and then establish a conceptual distinction between the same two terms. From this viewpoint the Suarezian experiment can only be catalogued as another outright failure in the long history of this tempting but hopeless project.

The Mountain-Plains Philosophical Conference held its eleventh annual meeting at the University of Colorado, October 11-13, 1956. The general theme was "Philosophy and Politics." The papers were: "Politics and Nature," by Glenn Gray (Colorado College), discussed by Robert W. Craig (Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies); "Social Contract—Myth or Reality?" by Cornelius Sullivan (U. S. Air Force Academy), discussed by Henry W. Ehrmann (University of Colorado); and "Politics and Culture," by William Kent (University of Utah), discussed by Rollo Handy (University of South Dakota).

The Association for Realistic Philosophy held its fall meeting at Cambridge, Mass., on October 26 and 27, 1956. The papers were: "On the Being of Non-existents," by Rudolf Allers (Georgetown University), and "Comments on Psychology and the Concept of Human Nature," by Abraham Maslow (Brandeis University). There was also a discussion on "Some Problems for Realistic Philosophy—Concrete Commitment—Art, Politics, Religion." The panel was composed of Robert C. Baldwin (University of Connecticut), William A. Gerhard (Brooklyn College), Ellen Haring (Wellesley College), and J. Arthur Martin (Wheaton College).

The Guild of Catholic Lawyers of New York conducted its fourth annual Conference on the Natural Law on December 15, 1956. Professor Edwin P. McManus (Georgetown University Law School) led a discussion on "The Application of the Natural Law to the Fifth Amendment"; and Professor John C. Hayes (Loyola University Law School) led another on "The Application of the Natural Law to Private and Religious Schools under the United States Constitution."

The Saint Louis University Library announces a new journal, *Manuscripta.* To appear three times a year, the journal will usually contain material useful for research in the Knights of Columbus Vatican Film Library at Saint Louis University, scholarly articles of a more general nature (including articles based on research at the Library), and, in the early issues, the complete listing of all the codices filmed. Subscription price will be $4.00 per year; the journal will be published at Saint Louis University (Saint Louis 3, Missouri).

At the same time, the University Library announces a new project, the filming of rare printed books in the Vatican library. Copies of these films are to be made available at as low a price as possible.

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Two Notes on Fonseca

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I

Fonseca on Metaphor

Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599), the Portuguese Aristotle,[1] chief of the *Conimbricenses* (the group of Jesuit commentators on Aristotle from the University of Coimbra[2]), was one of the great figures of the Scholasticism of the Renaissance but is practically unknown today. *The Catholic Encyclopedia* says of him that "his greatest claim to lasting reputation lies in the fact that he first devised the solution, by his *scientia media* in God, of the perplexing problem of the reconciliation of grace and free will."[3] His fame as a theologian no doubt rests secure; but the title of "the Portuguese Aristotle" that he was given is an indication that he may have other claims to a lasting reputation. One of these claims is found in the fact that he was the proponent of a view of metaphor that deserves more than passing attention.

In his *Rhetoric,* Aristotle tells us that "metaphor must be drawn . . . from things that are related to the original thing, and yet not obviously so related—just as in philosophy also an acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things far apart."[4] He sees, then, a parallel between philosophical insight and that insight which results in metaphor. They both consist in perceiving resemblances even between things far apart. We wish here to turn attention towards the rather evident yet important point that the resemblances are between the things themselves, and not between aspects which are external to those things. Aristotle also tells us in his *Poetics* that "the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars."[5] We have, in this passage, a repetition of the same doctrine that we saw in the *Rhetoric;* namely, that a good metaphor (and we are not concerned with bad ones) implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars. There are two factors that we can see involved in all

metaphor; namely, the dissimilarity between two sets of things and, simultaneously, their similarity. They differ in their modes of being; and yet these diverse modes have a certain resemblance to one another. It is significant to notice Aristotle's comparison between the capacity to produce a good metaphor and the capacity for philosophical intuition. They both consist in the ability to discover resemblances between things which are dissimilar. The philosopher discovers the similarity in being between the diverse forms of being; the poet discovers similarities in nature, as when Keats calls the Grecian urn the "still unravished bride of quietness and slow time."

At the time of the Renaissance a question arose among the Scholastic philosophers as to whether metaphors were predicated intrinsically of their subjects; in other words, they asked whether a metaphor describes anything really present in a subject. The common example taken for illustrating the problem was that of a smiling field. *Smiling* is predicated metaphorically of a field, and the question is whether the field is really smiling or not. Some said no; others avoided a direct answer to the question;[6] and only one thinker, to our knowledge, replied clearly in the affirmative—namely, Fonseca. Among those who answered no, John of St. Thomas likens metaphor to the analogy of attribution insofar as both of them are extrinsic for one of their subjects.[7] Pedro Descoqs, S.J., divides proportionality into the

[1]See the *Enciclopedia Cattolica* (1950), v, 1488.

[2]See F. Copleston, S.J., *History of Philosophy* (3 vols., Newman Press), III, 341.

[3]See VI, 126, col. 1.

[4]iii. 2.

[5]22. 1459a3-7.

[6]See Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, ed. Zammit (Rome, 1952), cap. III, s. 25.

[7]"Dicimus analogiam attributionis et similiter metaphoricam, quae illi valde affinis est quantum ad formam analogice denominantem, necessario debere esse in uno intrinsece, in aliis extrinsece et denominative" (*Cursus Phil. Thom.*, log. II, q.13, a.4, ed. Reiser [Turin: Marietti, 1930], I, 847, col. 2, ll. 19-32).

[8]"[analogia] proportionalitatis . . . dividitur in *intrinsecam:* ita substantia et accidens relata ad esse, et *extrinsecam*, quae est metaphora: ita risus prati" (*Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis* [Paris: Beauchesne, 1935], II, 574).

[9]Page 255.

[10]". . . la métaphore . . . comporte une certaine réalisation intrinsèque qui entraîne quelque objectivité dans la comparaison" (*Le Rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* [Bib. Thomiste XV, Sect. Theol., 2; Paris: Vrin, 1931] p. 101).

[11]"Nam principium significat naturam principii existentem in omnibus, quae dicuntur principia, eodemque modo se res habent in caeteris non modo proprie dictis, sed etiam improprie, et per tropum. Ridere enim, exempli causa, significat risum non modo inhaerentem homini, sed etiam suo modo florenti prato. Namque ipsa florum productio est quaedam quasi hilaritatis significatio per vultum" (*In* IV *Metaphys. Arist.*, cap. 2, q.1, s. 6 [Rome, 1577], I, 545. The italics are mine.).

intrinsic and the extrinsic varieties, the latter being the proportionality of metaphor; "for example, the smile of a field."[8] Professor Anderson, in his *Bond of Being,* also denies that metaphor is intrinsic.[9]

The Abbé Pénido gives a tentative assent to the proposition that metaphor is intrinsic. He tells us that it "involves a certain intrinsic realisation, which entails some objectivity in the comparison."[10] But, seemingly, only Fonseca has stated without qualification that metaphors refer to something really present in the subject. In his *Commentary on the* Metaphysics *of Aristotle,* he tells us that

> the word "principle" signifies the nature of a principle existing in *all* those things which are called principles; and the same thing happens in the other cases not only of words used properly but also of those used *improperly and by extension of meaning.* For example, "to smile" means a smile not only inhering in a man but also *after its own manner* in a flowering meadow. For that production of flowers is, as it were, a certain signifying of laughter on the face.[11]

We might notice here that the definition of a metaphorical term is of a term used improperly and by extension of meaning. We have, then, in the above passage, a clear assertion that metaphorical terms are predicated intrinsically. Fonseca denies in this passage that the attribute designated by the metaphor is univocally present in each subject. He says rather that the smile is present in the field *after its own manner.* So the metaphorical use of a term implies a difference between the two subjects of its predication. Men's faces are dissimilar to fields. Yet on the other hand there is a similarity between these two subjects, since they both have smiles. Fonseca seems to be elucidating here Aristotle's remark about the "intuitive perception of similarity in dissimilars." We believe Fonseca's views to be a faithful elucidation of Aristotle's theory of metaphor. Aristotle was the philosopher *par excellence* of analogy; and when he likened the insight implied by a good metaphor to philosophical insight, we can only conclude that he saw metaphor as a form of intrinsic analogy. In confirmation of the above position let us note the following passage from Fonseca.

> It must be said that those things in which the analogy of proportionality is found simultaneously with the analogy of one to another, the form signified can be in all the members [that is, of the analogy], as is evident in *foot* insofar as it is predicated of the foot of an animal and of a bench. In the foot of a bench there can be seen, at the same time, both the imitation of an animal's foot (which is a certain attribution) and a certain proportion to it. So it is that "footness," which

is the form signified by the name "foot," is present after its own manner in the foot of a bench, just as it is in an animal's foot.[12]

Once more, then, metaphorical predication is asserted to be intrinsic; once more we are referred to the similarity in difference between two things, each possessing, after its own manner, something which is similar to something possessed by the other. Fonseca's next sentence after this passage is very significant: "In the same way, therefore, does a thing have being with respect to God, and to the creature, on account of each analogy, proportional as well as attributive."[13] From this statement, we can conclude that Fonseca saw no difference between the way in which *being* is predicated of a creature and the way in which *foot* is predicated of the foot of a bench, or *smiling* of a smiling field.

Before concluding we will notice one objection to the intrinsic predication of metaphors. Professor Anderson says that "things can receive a metaphorical predication not because they share integrally and properly a perfection or form which is common to them proportionately, but only because there is some dynamic likeness between them—a likeness consisting in the production of similar effects."[14] It is difficult to understand how things can produce similar effects without being similar to one another in some thing which is intrinsic to each one. St. Thomas says that "every agent

[12]"Dicendum est, in quibus analogiam proportionis simul reperitur cum analogia unius ad alterum, in iis posse formam significatam inesse in omnibus membris, ut patet in pede, quatenus dicitur de pede animalis et lecti, in pede enim lecti simul cernitur, et imitatio pedis animalis, (quae est quaedam attributio), et proportio quaedam ad illum. Ita sit ut pedalitas, quae est forma significata nomine pedis, insit suo modo in pede lecti, quemadmodum in pede animalis" (*ibid.*, s.7, p. 548).

[13]"Eodem igitur modo res habet in ente repectu Dei, et creaturae propter utramque analogiam, et proportionis et attributionis" (*ibid.*).

[14]*Bond of Being*, p. 172. See also E. L. Mascall, *Existence and Analogy*, p. 103, for a similar argument.

[15]"Cum enim omne agens agat sibi simile" (*Summa Theol.*, I, q.4, a.3. See *ibid.*, q.6, a.1; q.110, a.2).

[16]". . . quidquid est imago alicuius simili alteri, est etiam imago illius alterius quatenus primo assimilatur" (Cajetan, *De Conceptu Entis*, n. 3).

[17]Cf. the following passage from Fonseca's *In* IV *Metaphys. Arist.*, cap. 2, q.1, s.6 (I, 543): "Excludenda est in primis ab hac disputatione analogia quaedam, quam Arist. 7 Phys. cap. 4 et lib. 10 huius operis cap. 13 in natura generum subesse docet: quam D. Thom. I Sent. d.19 vocat analogiam secundum esse tantum, Caietanus autem in libello de analogia nominum analogia inaequalitatis . . . hoc genus analogiae . . . non impedit veram univocationem . . ."

[18]*Bond of Being*, p. 32.

[19]*Ibid.*, n. 1.

[20]Cf. Duns Scotus: "Omnis inquisitio de Deo supponit intellectum habere conceptum eumdem univocum quem accipit ex creaturis" (*Opus Oxon.*, d.1 q.3 a.2 n.10) and "Deus et creatura non sunt primo diversa in conceptibus tamen sunt primo diversa in realitate: quia in nulla realitate conveniunt" (*ibid.*, d.8 q.3 n.11).

produces its own likeness."[15] An agent can only produce its own likeness insofar as it produces something similar to itself. Now, a thing cannot be extrinsic to itself; and therefore likeness between things is due to something intrinsic to each thing. If the effects of two agents are similar, then the agents themselves must be similar to one another. Similarity, after all, is a symmetrical and transitive relationship.[16] In respect of any quality *Q*, if *A* is similar to *B*, then *B* is similar to *A*. If *A* is similar to *B* and *C* is similar to *D*, and if *A* is also similar to *C*, then *B* must be similar to *D*.

II

Fonseca on Logical Univocity

Fonseca's views on the subject of logical univocity are not without permanent value, and they show a fidelity to the thought of Aristotle which, in this field, is not easily to be found in the writings of his better-known commentators. Though their views coincide, Fonseca, to all evidence, arrived at his position independently of Aristotle. In fact, at one stage in his thought he adhered to the traditional view,[17] but he later made a radical change in his opinions and engaged in a vigorous criticism of the whole subject of logical univocity.

Professor Anderson, when discussing this subject (he calls it "analogy of inequality," following Cajetan's terminology), says that "the philosophic significance of analogy of inequality has been generally ignored, even by scholastic authors";[18] and in a footnote to this statement, he says that this "analogy" is usually disposed of in a few short paragraphs and very often not mentioned at all. "As far as I know, Cajetan wrote more on it than anyone up to his time (d.1534), namely five paragraphs, about three small pages (in his De Nom. Anal. 1, 6-9)."[19] Some fifty years after Cajetan's death, Fonseca was to submit the underlying assumptions of the analogy of inequality to a fundamental criticism. This, so far as we know, is the only criticism ever made of this form of analogy, leaving aside unpublished material.

The historical origins of the analogy of inequality—or, as we intend to call it, the theory of logical univocity—are difficult to discover. There are two fields in which the theory has application. One of them is that of Scotistic metaphysics; the other is that of generic predication. The Scotists maintain that terms common to God and creatures are univocally common, whereas, in reality, God and creatures have nothing univocally in common.[20]

As regards generic predication, it was a more or less unanimous opinion among Scholastic thinkers that while generic terms were predicated analogically of things in the physical world, they could nevertheless be predicated univocally of them provided you considered the generic idea in itself and apart from the things themselves. So, for example, the term "animal" is predicated analogically of real animals but univocally of the generic idea of an animal considered apart from all real animals.

Gilson traces the origins of Scotus's theory of being to Avicenna;[21] yet the explicit distinction between logical univocity and real analogy is not mentioned by Gilson as having been made by Avicenna himself. It may perhaps be reasonable to suppose that the explicit distinction was first made in the field of generic predication. Yet when we come to seek it there, we are unsuccessful. The historians have not yet investigated this field. When we have in fact come across it, the distinction is already treated as if it were common knowledge and as if everyone knew its sources. Most often it is ascribed, consciously or unconsciously, to Aristotle. There are two passages in his works which are, as it were, the *loci communes* for making the distinction. What is strange is that Aristotle does not himself make it, and in one passage he even rejects it. The relevant passages are the first part of Chapter 4, Book VII of the *Physics* and Chapter 10 of Book X of the

[21]See Gilson, *Duns Scot*, pp. 84-115.

[22]*Physics* VII. 4. 248b25-27.

[23]*Ibid.* 249a1-3.

[24]*Ibid.* 248b15.

[25]*Ibid.*, especially 249a21-25.

[26]See n. 17.

[27]See Averroes, *In* VII *Physic. Aristot. Comm.*, text. et comm., 25-26 and *In* X *Metaphys. Aristot. Comm.*, text. et comm., 26 (Venice, 1489).

[28]"Corruptibile et incorruptibile univocantur in genere logico, et tamen aequivocantur in genere naturae" (*In* X *Metaphys. Aristot. Comm.*, text. 26 [Venice, 1572], p. 303, verso col. 1 F).

[29]"Illa sunt infra unum genus logicum quae sunt infra unum conceptum potentialem, qui potest trahi ad diversas species" (*ibid.*).

[30]"Si enim diffiniuntur in communibus suis intentionibus secundum quod abstrahunt ab hoc et ab illo, et a quolibet alio multo vel duplo in universali: erit logica diffinitio istorum, et secundum rationem logicam erit in omnibus ejusdem rationis" (*In* VII *Phys. Arist.*, tract. II, text. et comm. 26, ed. Vives, III, 508). Cf. also "Animalis est una ratio ut generis. Si autem animal secundum esse sumitur in unoquoque, tunc variatur esse ejus differentiis specierum sibi adjunctis: et tunc sic variatum habet alteram et alteram secundum esse definitionem" (*In* I *De Anima Comm.*, tract. 1, cap. 4, text. et comm. 8, ed. Vives, v, 124, col. 1, in fine).

[31]Cf. the *De Anima* listed among the *dubia* of Duns Scotus where the author says that "ens autem prout praedicatur de decem praedicamentis metaphysice vel naturaliter, non dicit unum conceptum, nec est genus naturale eorum metaphysicum, tamen est genus univocum loquendo logice" (q.21, n.12).

[32]"Fieri ne possit, ut aliquid sit genus logice, quod non sit etiam physice?" (*In* V *Metaphys. Arist. Comm.*, cap. 8, q.4, s.4 [Rome 1589], II, 444).

Metaphysics. Aristotle denies logical univocity in the following words: "It would seem, however, that we must reject this solution, since clearly we could thus make all equivocal attributes univocal and say merely that that which contains each of them is different in different cases."[22] And he goes on to say that "it is not any casual thing that is capable of carrying any attribute; each single attribute can be carried only by one single thing."[23] He had previously said that "there are terms of which even the definitions are equivocal,"[24] and the text following upon this assertion goes to show that generic terms come under this heading.[25] Among Aristotle's Scholastic commentators, it seems that only Fonseca upheld this view, and even he at one point admitted its contrary.[26]

Averroes, in his commentaries upon the above passages, does not put forward the theory of logical univocity. He contents himself with repeating and elucidating Aristotle's words.[27] As regards Avicenna, we are not aware that he ever made explicit reference to it in his writings. In fact, the first thinker I am aware of who mentions logical univocity is Alexander of Hales. In his commentary on the above-mentioned text of the *Metaphysics*, Alexander says that although corruptible and incorruptible bodies do not have a common physical genus, they nevertheless have a common logically univocal one.[28] The reason he gives for this is that corruptible and incorruptible come under one "potential concept which can be drawn to diverse species."[29] He quotes no authority for saying this and gives no impression that he thinks himself to be saying anything novel. Albertus Magnus also mentions the logically univocal genus in the process of commenting upon the *Physics*. He says that you can give the same definition to different things if you define them by their common ideas and in abstraction from all differentiating characteristics that they might possess. Such a definition will be univocal.[30]

From the time of Alexander of Hales to the time that Fonseca wrote his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the logically univocal genus received an uncritical acceptance. In the system of Duns Scotus, conceptual univocity, which seems to be just another name for logical univocity,[31] assumed a fundamental importance. But with Fonseca the whole basis of the distinction is called into question. In the fifth book of the above commentary he asks the question "whether it is possible that something be a genus logically when it is not so physically."[32] His answer is that

> although the intellect is so powerful that it apprehends in one simple concept the most distinct and disjoined things—namely, insofar as they make up some one thing, one either absolutely or after a certain

manner—even so, it can never conceive in a univocal concept, things which by their nature are only analogically similar.[33]

This conclusion is universal in its application. It applies not only to generic predication but to all cases of attempted univocity in the face of a real analogy.

He draws his conclusions from four basic arguments. The first one is that a concept cannot belong equally to two subjects unless they are equal in their possession of the given nature. Such a concept would not be predicated of them unless it represented their natures as being equal to one another.[34] The implication behind this latter statement is that *to represent* is to stand for a thing as it really is. The basis on which the argument rests is the Aristotelo-Thomistic principle that our ideas of things are produced by the things themselves[35] and also the principle that agents produce their own likenesses in their effects.[36] The conclusion follows that there cannot be a univocal idea common to two things unless they both have the same nature. The second argument maintains that "it implies a contradiction to make a univocal concept of substance, while making the substance itself

[33]"Dicendum est: etsi intellectus tantum vim habet, ut distinctissima ac disiuntissima etiam uno simplici conceptu apprehendat, nempe quatenus ea unum aliquid efficiunt, sive simpliciter, sive secundum quid; nunquam tamen concipere posse univoco conceptu quae analogice tantum natura sua conveniunt" (*ibid.*, p. 446).

[34]"Conceptus formalis non potest aequaliter participari, nisi cum natura per eum repraesentata, seu conceptus obiectivus aequaliter participatur: neque participatur nec praedicatur talis conceptus, nisi ratione eius, quod repraesentat. Quare si nulla datur substantia communis, quae ex aequo participetur a particularibus substantiis, nec conceptus quo illa apprehenditur, ex aequo ab eisdem participabitur" (*ibid.*, p. 445).

[35]"In nobis acquiritur [scientia] per hoc quod res imprimunt similitudines suas in animas nostras" (*De Ver.*, q.2, a.1) and "Voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum similitudines" (*Summa Theol.*, I, q.13, a.1).

[36]"Cum enim omne agens agat sibi simile" (*Summa Theol.*, I, q.4, a.3).

[37]". . . implicat ergo contradictionem facere conceptum substantiae vere univocum, et ipsam substantiam vere analogam" (*In* V *Metaphys. Arist.*, p. 445).

[38]"Non potest igitur conceptus formalis substantiae in communi sumptae univocus esse et genericus, si substantia in communi sumpta, univoca genusque non sit" (*ibid.*) and cf. St. Thomas: "Modus praedicandi proportionatur ipsis rebus de quibus fit praedicatio" (*In* I *Sent.*, d.19, q.4, a.2, ad 1).

[39]"Postremo, quia isto modo quem ponunt, facile erit omnes naturas univocas de medio tollere, solaque nomina et conceptus formales cum Nominalibus univoca facere: dicemus enim nomina hominis et animalis, et eorum conceptus formales esse univoca; ipsas vero hominis et animalis naturas esse analogas, et sic in caeteris omnibus" (*In* V *Metaphys. Arist.*, p. 445).

[40]"Nec satis intelligo quo sensu possit esse verum, dari commune genus logicum absque convenientia reali in una natura. . . . Nam omnis intentio generis, et abstractio univoca nostri conceptus fundatur in reali convenientia specierum sub genere contentarum, et ideo unitas universalis, quae concipitur in genere, supponit unitatem formalem ipsius naturae genericae" (*Disp. Metaphys.*, d.35, s.3, n.40).

analogous."[37] The third argument is complementary to the first. While the first is based on the fact that concepts are formed through the causality of the things themselves, the third one stresses that they must represent things as they are. Fonseca says that "it is therefore not possible for the formal concept of substance, taken in its universal sense, to be an univocal and a generic concept, if substance in its universal sense is not univocal and is not a genus."[38] What he emphasizes in these arguments is the direct connection between the meaning of a term and the thing as it really is. The fourth argument seems to be the converse of that used by Aristotle. The latter had argued that if you accept logically univocal terms, you make it possible to say that all equivocal attributes are univocal. Fonseca goes the other way and says that you could treat all natures as analogical, merely saying that their concepts are univocal. So the idea "man" would be univocal to all men, yet in reality their humanity would be only analogically common. Fonseca seems to suggest that a resemblance exists between this position and nominalism, insofar perhaps as, in each case, there is no longer any basis in reality for the common name or concept which is predicated.[39] But while Aristotle's argument holds good, the same is not so evident in Fonseca's case. If you say that there can be logically univocal terms, it does not seem to follow directly that all univocal terms must be logically so. Nevertheless, logical univocity does seem to leave the door open to some form of nominalism, or at least to something closely akin to it.

Although Fonseca was unique in his explicit rejection of logical univocity, it is interesting to note that Suarez expressed certain doubts about the matter. He protests,

> Neither do I sufficiently understand in what sense it can be true that a common logical genus is given without a real community in nature. . . For every generic idea and univocal abstraction of our concept is founded in a real community of species contained under the genus; and therefore the universal unity which is conceived in the genus supposes the formal unity of the generic nature itself.[40]

The great exponent of the Suarezian system in our own day, Pedro Descoqs, S.J., was prepared to admit that it "is not impossible" to say that generic

concepts are purely analogical both in fact and in concept.[41] The alternative is to say that they are univocal both in fact and in concept, but such a view would not seem to find much support in Scholastic philosophy.

[41]"On peut dire, il est vrai, que le concept générique d' 'animal' représente par analogie les différences elles-mêmes, mais à la condition qu'on ne le prenne plus comme univoque *secundum intentionem* et qu'on le rende analogue *etiam secundum intentionem:* ce qui n'est pas impossible" (*Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis* [Paris, 1925], p. 246).

Angustia y Esperanza. Clave Teológica al Laberinto Filosófico de Nuestro Tiempo. Barcelona: Herder, 1956. Pp. 379. Paper. By Marianus Müller, O.F.M. Trans. Miguel Oltra, O.F.M.

The original, *Verheissung des Herzens,* appeared in 1953. It is an amalgam of philosophy and theology justified by its author on the ground of references to St. Bonaventure and Duns Scotus. Charging that contemporary Catholic theology is intellectualistic and, to the extent that it follows Molina, naturalistic, the author maintains that the just desires of modern thought (for example, the existentialists) can be met only by a theology which is a *practical* wisdom. The polemics of the author seem at times to be more ardent than facts or logic would seem to warrant. That modern man desperately needs faith, hope, and love does not prove that theology must be practical, unless one were to confuse faith, theology, and preaching.

Anima Mundi. La Filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la Scuola di Chartres. By Tullio Gregory. Firenze: Sansoni, 1955. Pp. 294. Paper, 2500 lire.

This richly documented and careful study begins with a brief chapter on the life and writings of William of Conches. In three successive chapters, the author studies William's theology, his doctrine of the soul of the world and of individual souls, and his idea of nature. Through these chapters, the author also treats the ideas of other members of the school of Chartres. In the fifth chapter, he analyzes the cultural ideals of the school. The movement at Chartres differed in many different respects from that at Paris, and historians of the thought of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries will find in the present work valuable source material.

Bilan et perspectives. By Karl Jaspers. Trans. Hélène Naef and Jeanne Hersch. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1956. Pp. 260. Paper.

This present work is a translation of *Rechenschaft und Ausblick,* which appeared in 1951. It is a collection of essays, some of which were written as early as 1941. The topics are various: philosophy and science, the

European spirit, a new humanism, freedom, the danger of atomic warfare, the nature of philosophy, Jasper's own philosophy, Kierkegaard, evil in Kant, the prophet Ezechiel, Solon, and Goethe.

Ciencia Moderna y Filosofia. **By Jose Maria Riaza, S.J. Madrid: La Editorial Catolica, 1953. Pp. xxxi + 756 + xvi (plates). 75 pesetas.**

The purpose of this volume is to provide an adequate scientific background for students of philosophy and, in particular, to serve as a textbook for the "scientific questions" prescribed for the ecclesiastical degree of licentiate in philosophy. It contains sections on mathematics, physics, and chemistry. There is an ample bibliography (pp. xiii to xxxi).

The selection of materials is based on their pertinence for the course in the philosophy of nature, and the choice the author has made is excellent.

Declarationes Magistri Guilelmi de la Mare, **O.F.M.,** *De Variis Sententiis S. Thomae Aquinatis.* **Ed. Franz Pelster, S.J. "Opuscula et Textus, Series Scholastica." Munich: Aschendorff, 1956. Pp. 31. Paper.**

The introduction gives a very brief history to serve as background for the present work; this is followed by the essential facts about William of Mare and the information concerning the present text. It is, as the author points out, the basis for the later and more elaborate controversies concerning Thomistic doctrines.

Le Dieu des philosophes et des savants. **By Régis Jolivet. "Encyclopédie du Catholique au XXème Siècle," I, No. 15. Paris: Librarie Arthème Fayard, 1956. Pp. 126. Paper, 300 fr.**

This collection of small volumes is aimed at a reader of good general education but not necessarily having special competence in any particular field. The present volume should prove most valuable to this kind of reader.

For one thing, the author clearly realizes that belief in God rests on experience and is arrived at without the aid of formal reasoning. This "prescientific" knowledge is had by most persons; it is in a sense a "natural" knowledge and gives the sense of reality to our thoughts about God. Because most writers on natural theology make no effort to link the natural knowledge with demonstration of God's existence, the complaint is often made that philosophical knowledge of God is merely abstract and unreal.

Another special advantage of the present volume is its keeping in touch with contemporary views and problems, such as the current objections

against the very knowledge of God, problems of transcendance, creation, and the like.

Ernest Renan. **By Jules Chaix-Ruy. Paris: Emmaneul Vitte, 1956. Pp. 514. Paper.**

This study of Renan is an attempt to relate his life and his thought to each other. Without in any way reducing thought to circumstances or temperament, the author skillfully shows how Renan wrestled with an idea but masked his anxiety under the refinement which his age affected. Nevertheless, the present work is properly speaking a biography, not a philosophical study. But it is biography of a high order, especially valuable because little has been done in this field.

Es El Arte Una Máscara Trágica? **By Luis Farré. Tucuman, Argentina: Universidad Nacional, n.d. Pp. 41. Paper.**

This is a short lecture on art, or culture, given in May, 1955. The author tries to show that art, like philosophy, is an expression of the human spirit and that some of the peculiarities of modern art are due to the same basic attitudes that are expressed by existentialism and by the spirit of revolt.

Gabriel Marcel, philosophe et dramaturge. **By Edgard Sottiaux. Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1956. Pp. 219. Paper.**

This work is in two parts, first, an introduction to the thought of Marcel, then a commentary on two plays. The philosophy of Marcel is presented in terms of "communion"; and this is considered in three stages, first in its imperfect forms of community, then in profound reflection upon being in the meeting with another person, and thirdly in the communion with the Transcendant.

The two plays chosen for commentary are *Un homme de Dieu,* and *Le monde casse.*

Historia de la Filosofía. **By Johannes Hirschberger. Trans. Martínez Gómez, s.j. Barcelona: Herder, 1954-1956. Vol. I, pp. xiv + 516; Vol. II, pp. viii + 566.**

Hirschberger's text is a well known one, and the translator aptly qualifies it as more philosophical than historical. Purely biographical material is reduced to a minimum (on an average, half a page); bibliographies are

brief, six to ten of the most important secondary sources being listed for each author studied. In the main, the author is interested in the thought. In each case, he makes frequent references to the original texts on the basis of which he builds up his interpretation.

The author's own point of view about "perennial philosophy" is to be seen in the way in which he builds up a developing thread of thought from the pre-Socratics to the Renaissance (the contents of Volume 1). The second volume continues this effort, in connecting Descartes with his predecessors and showing how later thinkers developed from him. But post-Kantian thought is somewhat difficult to evaluate in these terms. Sometimes a historian is inclined to object to what seems a distortion caused by the tendency to systematize, yet in the main the author retains objectivity and balance.

The Spanish edition contains the material prepared by the author for the second edition of the German. The translator has indicated Spanish translations of secondary sources where they exist. He has also added two very valuable appendices, one on the history of Spanish philosophy, the other a bibliography of Spanish philosophy.

Horizonte de la Metafisica Aristotelica. **By Salvador Gómez Nogales, s.j. "Estodios Onienses." Madrid: Ediciones Fax, 1955. Pp. 416. Paper.**

This work is a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Gregorian University (Rome). In the first part, the author considers the historical development of the idea of a metaphysics from the Greeks to the moderns. In the second part, he takes up the various names which Aristotle himself used to refer to it, as well as the history and meaning of "metaphysics." In the third part, he takes up the Aristotelian meaning of *episteme*. In the fourth part, he gives the various designations made by Aristotle of the object of metaphysics. Then he considers the various solutions given in recent years to the problem set up by the Aristotelian terms. Finally, he indicates what his own solution is, indicating that Aristotle "insinuates" this solution. He holds that the metaphysics of Aristotle has three parts: etiology, in which we discover the existence of suprasensible causes of sensible things; then theology, which deals directly with the nature of God; thirdly, ontology, which passes from the perfections of God to the properties of being in general; only this last part is strictly scientific.

There are a lengthy bibliography (pp. 244-398) and detailed indices.

Introducción a la Historia de la Literaturá Teológica de la Escolástica Incipiente. **By Arthur Michael Landgraf. Trans. Constantino Ruiz Garrido. Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1956. Pp. 253. Paper.**

The author has revised and enlarged his original *Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastic* (1948) for the present translation. The work, as is well known, has three parts. In the first, the author gives a general view of Scholasticism and its development and characteristics. In the second, he considers the different types of works written in the early Middle Ages. In the third, he takes up the formation of various "schools," around the masters St. Anselm of Canterbury, Bruno the Carthusian, Anselm of Laon and William of Champeaux, Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, Gilbert de la Porrée, Magister Simon, Peter Lombard, Prepositinus, Odo of Ourscamp, Andrew of St. Victor, and William of Auxerre.

Itinéraire de l'âme en elle-même. **By St. Bonaventure. Trans. with an introd. by Jean de Dieu de Champsecret, with a commentary by Louis de Mercin, O.F.M.Cap. Blois: Librairie Mariale et Franciscaine, 1956. Pp. 355. Paper, 850 fr.**

This translation of the work entitled in the critical edition *De Triplici Via* (and sometimes called *Incendium Amoris*) was first published in 1929, under the title *Les trois voies.* The introduction and commentary are new.

The book begins with a brief account (pp. 1-27) of St. Bonaventure's life and doctrine, in which the translator holds that St. Bonaventure's thought is the equal of St. Thomas's and more suitable to the present time. In the introduction to the work itself (pp. 29-117), the translator explains the "three ways" (purification, illumination, union) and devotes a great deal of attention to the Bonaventurian doctrine of contemplation and its relation to charity. The translation is preceded by a "Little Commentary" by an unknown author who is presumed to have been almost a contemporary of St. Bonaventure's (pp. 118-20).

The Commentary (pp. 197-352) concerns itself with theoretical and practical aspects of meditation, prayer, and contemplation.

Les mardis de Dâr le-Salâm. **Sommaire MCMLIII. Ed. Louis Massignon. Paris: Vrin; 1956. Pp. 248.**

This issue contains four very significant studies, which were first given in the form of conferences at the Center of Studies Dâr el-Salâm in Cairo. Louis Massignon considers the religious meaning of the last pilgrimage of Gandhi. Louis Gardet takes up culture and humanism, first in Indian

culture and then in the cases of Mohammedan and Christian humanisms; next, he considers Marxian man and, finally, the problem caused by the presence in our world of these four different humanisms, with their various similarities and differences. The Reverend Georges C. Anawati, O.P., summarizes the history of Arab medicine up to the time of Avicenna. Roger Arnaldez comments on theological controversies in Ibn Hazm of Cordova and Ghazali.

Metafisica di Una Crisi. **By Nunzio Incardona. Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1955. Pp. 262. Paper, 2000 lire.**

Incardona, a Christian Spiritualist, here takes up the existentialist theme of "crisis." The book begins with a discussion of morality from the view of man as spirit. Then, in the second chapter, there is a discussion of humanism, followed by a discussion of spiritual irony. The fourth chapter considers "crisis" as a category of existence, and the last chapter sets up the metaphysical foundations of "crisis" in the metaphysical experience of the ego.

Die Natur des Menschen. **By Georg Siegmund. Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1955. Pp. 167.**

This book is a presentation of the philosophical view of man, Thomistic in orientation, as a background for understanding the nature and function of the healing arts. The main points stressed are the unity of man, the reality of the soul, and the importance of psychological health for bodily health. Perhaps the psychosomatic origins of all illness are overstressed. The author holds that germs do not invade the organism and that because of an unresolved conflict of desires germs instrumentally work to tear the organism down. Recent discoveries of the chemical basis of some psychoses would seem to indicate that there are no purely psychogenic illnesses. In spite of some exaggeration, however, there are some very provocative insights in this book.

Die Ontologie der Kultur. **By Otto Samuel. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1956. Pp. vii + 271.**

The problem which the author sets himself is the question of "another world," whether it be a future life, a world of ideas, and so on. He thinks that those who have denied it have become positivists or materialists, and those who have affirmed it have become acosmists. He wants to find a way

of integrating both "worlds" into one universe. He considers that the way of doing this is by an analysis of culture, which discovers a "meontology," the "nonbeing" of spirit. In elaborating this notion, he makes use of Hegelian and existentialist notions.

Having set up his fundamental principle of the nature of spirit, the author first works about the problems of form (time and space) and then of content (the doctrine of the categories, of matter, substance, and the ego; physics, life, ethics, and theology).

Le Pari de Pascal. **By Georges Bruent. Preface by Jean Mesnard. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1956. Pp. 140. Paper.**

The author first presents plates showing in reduced size the manuscript of the celebrated "wager." Then he gives a transliteration of the text, corrections and all. This is followed by a commentary and discussion, with a conclusion. Finally, he presents a text arranged typographically to bring out the relationship of the various paragraphs to each other.

The study is a model of its kind. The author has discovered in Pascal's language an equivocation, which he thinks may account for the wide variety of opinions concerning the value of this "argument." The expression, "to take a chance," seems to provide the same ambiguity; at any rate, the notions of "choice," "risks," and "wager" are all contained in the argument, and appeal now to the will, now to the intellect.

Pierre Damien et la culture profane. **By J. Gonsette, S.J. Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1956. Pp. 104. Paper.**

Though this is a brief study, it is a very valuable one. The author first considers the condition of secular culture in Damien's lifetime, and finds it to be not only shallow but also unreasonably self-confident; he maintains also that St. Peter Damien spoke only about culture and knowledge *in the concrete,* and his condemnations therefore do not have universal bearing. Next, the author examines the notion of "nature" in the early Augustinians, and shows that all of them considered nature, not in the sense of an intrinsic principle of activity, but rather as concrete historical fact due to the will of God. For this reason, their attitude to the divine omnipotence was bound to be different from that of anyone who had an Aristotelian notion of nature. The author concludes that, though St. Peter Damien often spoke infelicitously, he was not fundamentally an anti-intellectual but an Augustinian, deeply concerned with the contemporary situation of intemperate dialecticians.

Psychologia Metaphysica. By Paul Siwek, S.J. 5th ed.; Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. xvi + 582. Paper.

This well-known and popular textbook has been revised and brought up to date both in content and in its bibliography. Among books of its kind, the text is noteworthy for its special attention to contemporary thought and a rather full consideration of objections.

Psychologie der Persönlichkeit. By Heinz Remplein. 2d ed.; Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1956. Pp. 684. DM 22; paper, DM, 19.

This is a very detailed and inclusive textbook. It consists of three main parts: particular elements of personality (vitality, temperament, character, talent), particular types of personality, according to the various methods of classification, and the discovery of personality (means of investigation, tests, and so on). Because of its very inclusive nature, which does not adhere to any limited "school," the book provides a good general view and by means of its generous documentation will be of great value to both the philosophy of human nature and to ethics.

Saint Augustin et le néoplatonisme. By M. F. Sciacca. Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1956. Pp. 67. Paper, 65 fr. b.

This volume contains the lectures of the "Chair Cardinal Mercier" of the University of Louvain for 1954. Professor Sciacca, one of the foremost Catholic philosophers of Italy, shows how he conceives the relation between faith and reason in the case of St. Augustine. He maintains, first, that St. Augustine was a believer before reading the books of the Platonists but was able to understand and accept fully this faith only afterwards. Yet he interpreted rather than learned from Plotinus. Secondly, Professor Sciacca tries to show that St. Augustine's doctrine of man is not dualistic and that this correction of neo-Platonism was brought about by his Christian faith. Finally, he asserts that "Christian philosophy" is the medium between rationalism on the one hand and confusion of philosophy and faith on the other. Yet he does not seem to make a clear distinction between rational discourse founded on faith and that which is instructed by faith but not founded on it; probably this distinction would seem to him to be rationalistic.

El Sentido de la Responsabilidad. **[By Juan Beneyto.] Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto; Burgos: Instituto Historico Juridico Francisco Suarez, 1955. Pp. 68. Paper.**

This is a thematic summary prepared as a preliminary announcement and orientation for a seminar. But it contains some very useful suggestions and references. The first chapter presents the elements for a theory of responsibility, with many references to the theories of Arnaiz-Alcalde and Roberti. It is also concerned with social and political responsibility. The second chapter considers some theories about responsibility to be found in ancient philosophy and compares them with the Kantian theory. The third sets down the principles of Suarez, which according to the plan of the seminar will be taken as principles of solution.

Théorie de l'assentiment. **By Antonio Rosmini. Trans. with introd. and notes by Marie-Louise Roure. Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1956. Pp. 210. Paper.**

The text here translated is the first book of the three written by Rosmini under the title *Logica.* Its content can be seen from the titles of the four chapters, "The Nature of Assent," "The Norms Which Should Direct Man in Assent," "The Reason for Assent," and "The Causes Why Man Does Not Give the Assent Required by Reason or Gives It without Reason or against It."

There is a lengthy introduction (pp. 5-97), in which the translator gives a brief general outline of Rosmini's philosophy, a more detailed presentation of the whole logic, and a minute analysis of the first book. This introduction makes the present text of very great value for all students of Rosmini.

La Trinité (livres VIII-XV). Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, **tome 16. Trans. P. Agaësse, S.J., with notes in collaboration with J. Moingt, S.J. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955. Pp. 706.**

Since the first volume of the *De Trinitate* had already contained a lengthy introduction, the editors content themselves with a rather brief consideration of the method of St. Augustine and an outline of the contents of the second half of the work. In the introduction, an excellent point is made; namely, that this half of the work is just as theological, even though it employs an elaborate psychological reflection.

The text, as is usual in this series, presents the Latin of the Benedictine

edition with a French translation on facing pages. Notes to the text are given on pages 571-661. In addition to the two authors mentioned above, some of the notes are written by F. Cayré. The notes are philological, historical, philosophical, and theological, making the edition of great value to students. There are also five pages of bibliography and several sets of tables and indices.

L'Universe leibnizien. **By Joseph Moreau. Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1956. Pp. 256. Paper.**

With the republication and translation of some of Leibniz's works, a small revival of interest in his philosophy has begun. The present study is a richly documented view of the whole system. In the first part, the author considers the early works, especially the first sketch of the Leibnizian metaphysics, the continuum, matter and spirit, and universal harmony. In the second part, the author takes up the instruments which Leibniz fashioned to develop his philosophy; the universal "characteristic," definition, the calculus, the criticism of Cartesian mechanics, and the substitution of force and of dynamics. In the third part, the final synthesis is considered: the relation between physical explanation and finality, the system of monads, the principle of reason, essence and existence, and nature and grace. The author holds that Malebranche and Spinoza both had important roles to play, though different ones, in Leibniz's development.

L'Uomo Questo "Squilibrato". Saggio sulla Condizione Umana. **By Michele Federico Sciacca. Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1956. Pp. 331. Paper, 2500 lire.**

Professor Sciacca is one of the foremost representatives of "Christian spiritualism." In the present work, he relates his basic view of spirit as act to the concerns of contemporary thought. In the first part, entitled "The Human Condition and Its Structure," he reflects on existence, which he considers to be the experience of being, the individual, the person, the ego; body and spirit, the experience of my body, "createdness" as the authentic vocation of man, and the relation of man to his fellows. In the second part, entitled "Moral Intelligence and Ethical Reason," he examines problems of value and goodness. (By "intelligence" Sciacca means the intuition of ideal being; by "reason," the knowledge and judgment about concrete beings in the light of intelligence.) In the practical order, "ethical reason" discovers particular obligations; but "moral intelligence" sees the fundamental, ideal goodness back of all particular goods.

Utopía y Realidad en el Erasmismo Español. By Octavio Corvalan. Tucumán, Argentina: Universidad Nacional, n.d. Pp. 41. Paper.

After a short introduction to indicate the general problem of the Spanish renaissance, the author considers the life and works of Alfonso de Valdés, with some illustrations of the influence of Erasmus in several of Valdés's dialogues.

Chronicle (continued)

The Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association will be held April 23 and 24, 1957, at the Conrad Hilton Hotel in Chicago. The general theme of the discussions will be, "Ethics in Relation to Other Knowledges." The four major papers will be: "St. Thomas's Approach to Moral Philosophy," by Ignatius T. Eschmann, O.P. (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies), with the commentary by the Reverend George C. Reilly, O.P. (Catholic University of America); "Ethics and the Faith," by the Reverend James J. Doyle, S.J. (West Baden College), commentary by the Reverend Luke Burke, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure University); "Ethics and Epistemology," by Elizabeth G. Salmon (Fordham University), commentary by William O'Meara (University of Chicago); and "Ethics and Natural Theology," by John A. Riedl (Marquette University), commentary by Bernard J. M. Boelen (Duquesne University). In addition there will be an evening meeting and round table discussions in the afternoons.

The Metaphysical Society of America will hold its annual meeting at Indiana University, Bloomington, March 22 and 23, 1957. On Friday afternoon, there will be a panel discussion on "Substance, Process, and Being," by George K. Plochmann (Southern Illinois University), Albert W. Levi (Washington University), and Laurence J. Lafleur (University of Akron), with a commentary by Campbell Crockett (University of Cincinnati). Friday evening the presidential address, "The Problem of Being and Analogy," will be given by the Reverend George P. Klubertanz, S.J. (Saint Louis University), with the commentary by Werner Wick (University of Chicago). Saturday, the morning and afternoon sessions will be taken up with in-

dividual papers: "Ideology and Postulational Metaphysics," by William Oliver Martin (University of Rhode Island), commentary by Harold A. Durfee (American University); "The Nature of Spiritual Being" by William Carlo (St. John's University), commentary by the Reverend Robert F. Harvanek, S.J. (West Baden College); "Current Trends in British Philosophy," by John Wisdom (Cambridge University); "Heidegger's Ontology," by Thomas D. Langan (Saint Louis University), commentary by Wilfrid Desan (Kenyon College), and "The Ontological Status of Values," by Richard Barber (Tulane University), commentary by Leonard J. Eslick (Saint Louis University).

The Twelfth International Congress of Philosophy was announced for the first half of September, 1958, by the International Federation of Philosophical Societies. The Italian Philosophical Societies will be the host, and the meetings will be held at Venice, with one meeting at Padua. The three themes proposed for the plenary sessions are: "Man and Nature," "Liberty and Value," and "Logic, Language, and Communication." The deadline for communications on these themes, as well as for papers on other themes, will be the end of March, 1958. The Secretaries are Professor Mario Dal Pra of the University of Milan, and the Reverend Carlo Giacon, S.J., of the University of Messina; the address of the Secretariate is Via Donatello 16, Padua.

THOMAS D. LANGAN, *Saint Louis University*

Social Foundations of Education. **By Harold Rugg and William Withers. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955. Pp. 771.**

Despite its nonsense—almost, in fact, *because* of it—this book is critically important, with grave implications. The superficiality of its analyses and their very scope (psychology, the physical sciences, economics, politics, education, are discussed at great length) bespeak the kind of "culture" contemporary man can expect in the *Neuzeit.* The included compendium of Western history—an encyclopedia in forty pages of all the errors that an educationist-formed scholarship can perpetuate—shows clearly the abandonment of an entire *Geschichte,* the tradition which stretches from Anaximander to Nietzsche. This proves that we are beyond Nietzsche, who saw himself as the final *deroulement* of that tradition and its death. It *is* dead now; the history no longer even has a meaning. The book's textbook style is a more forceful assertion of the attitude of the *Neuzeit* than its author's expressed disdain for a tradition that sought to render its young "merely literate" (pp. 17-18). The book's propaganda tone and falsifications make of it an admirable example of the instruments needed within our schools to convert them finally into the institutions of social engineering envisioned by the new philosophers.

This is not "just another textbook." Rather it is the kind of theoretical-practical instrument that is bound to determine the formation of the educational system and through it the entire American society in the next fifty years. It is a capital representative of the *Entwertung* of the modern nihilism. It itself represents and capitulates the breaking down of structures which, until the last century, had still managed to resist the long eroding of the ontological substance of the Greco-Christian tradition.

The authors, the philosophers of the brave new world, are practical men—economists, educationists (the more latinized form belongs only to the ancient "merely literate" tradition), social engineers. As they go about their task—the destruction of the educational structures of the old tradition and the erection of a new "social" educational system—they crash through old structures with abandon. Thus St. Augustine comes to receive his notion of the spiritual from Plato (p. 311); the Blessed Trinity is an example of

social thinking in the Middle Ages (p. 317); "the mediaeval conception of the world rules out change" (p. 315); Isadora Duncan and Frank Lloyd Wright find themselves equal creators of the aesthetic of the new society (p. 500); the school is substituted for life (p. 38). Life becomes the assurance of abundance, and the authors are "deeply concerned that the schools should be utilized in producing it" (p. 494). To this end freedom is important. In answer to the question, Why is the choice between freedom and security (that is, a totalitarian system) unnecessary? the philosophers respond that "freedom is essential to the greatest economic production" (p. 60). Newspeak is of course an important instrument in the *Entwertung* of the Greco-Christian tradition. The authors admit an "economic bias," but they promise to work deliberately to overcome it. The proponents of the liberal arts ("its result was a supposedly educated 'elite,' their minds stocked with half-developed skills, a smattering of knowledge in mathematics and languages, and half-baked generalizations from the orthodox interpretation of the sciences" [p. 496]) are characterized, in Newspeak, as "the Practical Men of business and politics" (p. 495), and the old tradition's structure of education is termed "the practical tradition and the conforming way." The progressive schools become, conversely, "creative and democratic" (p. 493).

The authors are actually at grips with a grave problem of the *Neuzeit*. They are uncomfortable at the prospect that the scientific *Technik* which has grown to monopolize the attention of man in the nihilistic time requires the revaluing of all things in the way all too clearly spelled out by the Marxists. This humanism, in which man, with *Technik* as an instrument, revalues everything in terms of economic production, apparently collides with the new philosophers' human desire to retain a certain personal freedom. The philosophers seek a compromise by replacing the force of an organizing economic police state with the subtler organizing power of "free" conviction. The schools will form the citizen of the "free" economic democracy into a self-disciplining economic agent, self-disciplining in the sense that he will voluntarily seek through democratic instruments of government to impose upon himself a stringent governmental economic and social control that will assure the delicate economic machine's continued absorption of the *Technik's* energetic output. Instead of the Soviet solution, which envisions a state run by a small group of social and economic engineers, the philosophers envision a democratic economic state in which *all* the citizens become social and economic engineers and therefore freely vote the Soviet controls.

But why bother? Because, respond the new philosophers, psychologically the "free" system works better; that is, assures a higher productivity (p. 60).

This can be illustrated by the role of minority groups. A small amount of dissent in a society acts as a germ for new ideas. Of course, dissent must be kept to a minimum. A truly productive society must be harmonious; that is, homogeneous, peopled by the "relatively well-adjusted, co-operative young men and women, liked by and enjoying their fellows—in short, fitting members of society" (p. 34).

It may also be that this notion of "freedom," though so obviously a parody on the Greco-Christian notion of a *homo liber,* simply rests in the spirits of the new philosophers as an unexpurgated remain of the olden time.

The reader who dismisses this book as mere nonsense is blind to two orders of facts and therefore a fortiori remains himself essentially hidden in the past. (a) This book originated in the most influential educational center in America, Columbia, is written by respected authorities, and will be used for the formation of the formers of teachers. (b) The *Entwertung* presupposed by the book, the reign of the *Technik,* has taken place, and therefore the problem posed—namely, how to form citizens of a democracy so that they will vote themselves into their places in the economic machine—is, given the *Entwertung,* a real problem. It is, therefore, not this book, but the *Neuzeit* itself which is in question.

This book only serves to symbolize the enormity of the task confronting those who find the conception of the *Neuzeit* insupportable. For those who cannot bear the weight of the dead God there is only one solution: He must be made to live again. This is not to be accomplished by hanging on to the large pieces of the old structure which have not yet been washed away by the pounding of the sea. They will shortly disappear. Instead there must be a return to origins, a restructuring, a revaluing of the revaluing. This is a large task. God cannot be brought back into the world by weak efforts and paltry means; He must be brought back by ways that will have the appearance of a revolution. In this perspective, the Messrs. Rugg and Withers are effective prophets of the doom that will precede.

RICHARD J. BLACKWELL, *John Carroll University*

Philosophical Psychology. **By J. F. Donceel, S.J. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955. Pp. xiii + 363. $4.50.**

The general introduction to Father Donceel's textbook presents a definition of philosophical psychology which determines both the content and

the format of the main body of the book. Philosophical psychology is understood as "the science of living bodies which interprets the data of experience in the light of metaphysical principles" (p. 2). By experiential data is meant our everyday experience, plus biology and experimental psychology. This means in effect that philosophical psychology is a synthesis of the natural science and the metaphysics of living bodies. This combination is defended on the basis that metaphysics studies noumenal reality (beings as they are in themselves) and science phenomenal reality (beings as they appear to our senses). It is not explained precisely how this Kantian distinction is meant, which results in increasing rather than solving the difficulty of synthesizing metaphysics and experimental psychology. The larger portion of the book is devoted to, first, an experimental and then a philosophical discussion of man's sense life, rational life, and personality. These parallel scientific and philosophical analyses are quite independent of each other and do not explain how these two distinct ways of knowing are or can be synthesized, as is the claim of the author.

Part of the difficulty in regard to this theory of the relations between metaphysics and experimental psychology arises from Father Donceel's explanation of human intellectual knowledge. The agent intellect produces its ideas from within itself by using the phantasm as a model. The phantasm does not have a causal influence, even *instrumentally*, because "the immaterial intellect cannot be influenced by a material phantasm" (p. 218). Hence, although sense data is as a matter of fact somehow necessary for intellection, intellectual principles are inborn, or, as Father Donceel prefers, virtually a priori. Although the author claims that the intellect can and does transcend the domain of the senses, the crucial question here, as with Kant, is how intellectual cognition of noumenal reality (metaphysics) is possible. Father Donceel is right in insisting that this theory of knowledge is not, strictly speaking, the teaching of Kant. It is also not the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas.

JOHN E. CANTWELL, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

Social Justice. **By William F. Drummod, S.J. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1955.**

This book presents "a theory of social justice derived from an analysis of all that the encyclical *Quadregesimo Anno* says about the subject." It is introduced by a summary exposition of the field of justice, which is in-

tegrated around the point of the dignity of the human person. There is one defect in this chapter. The author says that "the common good . . . does take precedence over individual good. And it takes precedence in the sense in which it is a greater good. . . ." A careful reader will spot other words which put the individual on top. My complaint is that the author does not say more explicitly in what matters the common good prevails over the individual, and in what matters it does not.

The exposition of the meaning of social justice, which the author works out from the teachings of the encyclicals, is excellent. And his rejection of the view that social justice is legal justice is good; I think it is unfortunate that that idea, social justice is legal justice, ever occurred to anyone. But I think the author is wrong when he says that from the Encyclicals we can get the "exact meaning of 'social justice' . . . in its precise and technical sense." My reason is that in their Encyclicals the popes were not talking "by the books;" they did not intend to present a scientifically complete exposition of the virtue. They wrote and taught on the economic evils in the world and the cure of them. They showed that the situation was such that the true and correct handling of it was a matter of what they called social justice. The economic problems which the popes treated of were indeed material for that virtue, and the popes gave a solid, substantial, detailed exposition to prove that. But they simply did not touch the questions: what, speculatively, is the precise nature of the virtue, and what is the extent of its object. The answers to these questions were left to be worked out by the learned, professional men of the Church. And I think that the various theories about social justice which have been proposed, are a definite proof of that point.

The author begins his fourth chapter with the sentence "There is nothing new in the virtue of social justice as just defined [in the earlier chapters] except the name." That position is false. A new set of circumstances, the existence of a small number of "have's" and a great number of "have not's," had made very evident a new relation among men. I think the precise point of the whole question of social justice is that it is new matter, that the older moral theologians simply did not know of it, and so could not discuss it.

Again, in the next chapter, which is entitled "Obligations of Social Justice," the author is careful to state, "At this point it is suggested that none of the preceding is written in opposition to what has been called 'traditional doctrine.'" And again I say that until the moral theologians realize that "something new has been added," about which traditional doctrine knew nothing, they will be unable to handle the matters which belong to social justice. There is a new virtue here with its rights and obligations; these

must be fitted into the framework of the moral order that men live in.

Personally I find it annoying to read: ". . . both 'Rerum Novarum' and 'Quadragesimo Anno' following the teaching of St. Thomas . . .;" Christ and His Church do not follow any man, they lead.

In the last chapter of the book, "Social Justice and Social Organization," the author gives a very fine exposition of the method by which the goal of social justice is to be attained. It is so fine that I am surprised he did not come to see that other goods besides economic goods could be the object of the efforts of groups of men, that groups of men might well be obliged, as groups, to strive for those goods, and, consequently, that the virtue of social justice is not limited to economic goods alone.

J. REGINALD O'DONNELL, C.S.B., *Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies*

Petrus Abaelardus. Dialectica. **First Complete Edition of the Parisian Manuscript. By L. M. de Rijk, Ph.D. Assen: Royal van Gorcum, Ltd., 1956. Pp. xcvii + 637.**

This is the first volume of a series entitled *Wijsgerige Teksten en Studies*, published for the "Antiquity and Middle Ages" section of the Philosophical Institute of the Royal University of Utrecht. The series is under the direction of Professors C. J. de Vogel and K. Kuypers. The volume marks an auspicious beginning. Too little is known about the history of logic and in particular of Abelard's place in its development. Yet for Abelard, logic not only played an important and dominant role but was necessary for the defence of the Catholic faith (p. 470, ll. 4-7). This, the first complete edition of Abelard's *Dialectic*, presents an occasion to pursue further the history of logic.

The edition has been prepared from the only known manuscript of the work, that of Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, ms. latin 14614, which is, unfortunately, incomplete. It has not been possible to check the readings against those of the manuscript, but there is no suspicion that Dr. de Rijk has not carefully and correctly read the manuscript. Variations from the text, as established by V. Cousin, have been carefully noted; the readings of marginal corrections in the manuscript have often been adopted; many emendations, mostly by way of addition and suppression, have been introduced by the editor. In each case of emendation or choice of variant it is possible to defend the text of Dr. de Rijk, yet often the text of the manuscript could be defended equally well. When possible, the editor has

given the reader the sources of Abelard's work; these are mostly from Boethius.

The punctuation, always difficult, yet a signpost of interpretation, is generally quite acceptable. On page 81, line 3, delete the period after *quidem;* also line 17, insert a comma or semicolon after *quaedam.* On page 83, line 34, either insert a comma after *eorum* or delete the comma after *sunt.*

The orthography is standard: *cuiusdam* for *cujusdam,* and so on. On page 81, line 30, we find *dirivatum.* Why not *deriuatum?* One wonders why the work is entitled *Petrus Abaelardus Dialectica* instead of *Petri Abaelardi,* and so on, as in Cousin's edition.

The introduction, written in English, contains a short notice on Abelard's life and works, his sources, and an analysis of his logical theory. The volume concludes with three sets of indices: *index locorum, nominum, verborum et rerum.*

The volume is well printed. There are very few misprints. On page ix, note 4, read *Parisius* instead of *Parisios.* Incidentally, the edition of the *Historia Calamitatum* in Migne's *Patrologiae Cursus Completus* is far from the best. See also the misprints on pages ix, note 4; xvi, note 5; xx, line 6. There are also a few expressions somewhat unusual in English, notably on page xxxii, line 24.

In spite of these few remarks there can be no doubt that the work has been competently done. Congratulations are due Dr. de Rijk, the general editors, and the printers.

JOSEPH DE FINANCE, S.J., *Gregorian University*

Existence et Verité. **By Albert Cartier. Presses Universitaires de France. Pp. 253.**

This book is a study of Blondel's first *Action* in relation to today's existential problematic.

Father Cartier rightly observes that even Christian existentialists like Gabriel Marcel, owing to their insistence on the impossibility of the subject's separating himself from his own situation, risk being no longer able to save the universal validity of truth. And he maintains that the philosophy of Blondel, especially that which is presented in the thesis of 1893, offers a solution to this difficulty, while at the same time accepting whatever is legitimate in the existential evaluation of subjectivity with complete justice.

The author is thus led, after an introductory chapter on the "existential problematic," to examine in turn the threefold reconciliation in the dialectic of Blondel: freedom and necessity, liberty and truth, and existence and truth.

It is well known that the outcome of this dialectic is the tension between the "will willing" and the "will having willed." But the "will willing"—Father Cartier insists upon this—ought not be conceived as a subconscious tendency, a psychological act alongside of or below other acts, but rather as a "transcendental condition" of all will activity. The option which Blondel, at first glance, seems to place only on the end of the dialectic process, is in reality immanent in each one of its movements. It is only to reflexion that it appears to be the end, because it is the last to be "recovered." But it was there from the beginning and the dialectic advance was possible because of it alone.

The author sets himself to show how this option remains rational, however, even though its rationality appears only to the one who achieves it. The difficulties, in his opinion, come from a too rigid distinction between intelligence and volition, and, in intellectual activity itself, between the logical, objective connection and affirmation. Is such an explanation fully satisfying? It deserves, at any rate, to be taken into consideration. It is beyond doubt that in sharpening the distinction between the elements of reality unduly, one multiplies pseudoproblems and as a result multiplies errors. It is an error to judge an aspect or an element of an action as a concrete and complete action.

Very interesting also are the considerations of the author on the "phenomenalism" of Blondel; that is to say, on the distinction he carefully maintains between the "action" itself and the idea of the action, and in consequence between the "scientific" objective study of the implications of action and the existential affirmation of that which appears so implied, what is possible only by option. According to Father Cartier, Blondel, in 1893, unconsciously still remained a prisoner of the rationalistic problematic and imagined that by such a methodical dissociation it would be possible to obtain in a "scientific" manner a general agreement on the demands of action, with freedom intervening only to go from a theoretical viewpoint to an affirmation of existence. But this was to misunderstand that in the course of even "scientific" study, liberty is already active. Blondel himself was quick to realize what was unsatisfying in his position, but, instead of correcting his phenomenalism in the second edition of *Action* (1937-38), he preferred to renounce it. Father Cartier considers this a concession. It would have been possible, according to him, to develop a "consistent phenomenalism"—of which the last part of the book offers us an

outline—which alone is capable of reconciling existential thought with intellectual philosophy.

One can examine the conclusion and still feel ill at ease before certain pages of *Action,* but everyone will agree in recognizing the mastery of the author in explaining and exposing the subtle and deep thought of a great Christian philosopher. This book should be read by all those who are interested in the philosophy of Blondel and in the present currents of Christian thought.

JOHN E. GURR, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism. **By Jacques Maritain. Translated by Mabelle L. Andison and J. Gordon Andison. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1955. Pp. 383. $6.00.**

This book is a translation of the first book Maritain ever wrote, *La Philosophie Bergsonienne, Etudes Critiques* (1913; 2nd French Edition, 1929; reprinted in 1942). Bergsonian philosophy did for Jacques Maritain what Platonic philosophy did for St. Augustine: freed him from materialism and brought him to the threshold of Christian philosophy and theology. Four or five years after this development when he had taken a further step to discover that St. Thomas freed him from Bergson and carried him across that threshold, Maritain wrote two articles (1912) and gave a series of lectures at the Catholic Institute in Paris (1913) which were incorporated into this first book. Although most of its contents appeared before the publication of Bergson's later works, especially *The Two Sources of Religion and Morality* (1932), Maritain added to the original collection an "Essay in Appreciation" (1940) which considers these developments. Hence, the work as a whole is still a valuable study and critique of Bergson's philosophy and the author himself justifies its reappearance in English translation on the grounds that it is "probably a fair-to-middling account of basic Thomistic philosophy" and still has historical interest as well.

Moreover, because Maritain was concerned over the bursts of youthful ardor which forty years ago spotted the work with a tone and style somewhat severe and unjust, he wrote a fifty page preface to the second edition, included with this translation, which makes delightful and instructive reading. Therein even the general reader can gain many an insight into both the saintly character of Maritain and the perennial strength of his philosophy. And since the historical background of the science-philosophy relation

which explains, partially at least, the philosophy of Bergson as well as Maritain's rejection of this philosophy, is still part of our situation and background today, his work of analysis and criticism in this volume is of contemporary value.

Whether he knew it or not, Bergson's commitment to a philosophy of pure change was more a reaction against what his immediate predecessors in modern European philosophy had done to "essentialize" metaphysics and separate it from the concrete reality of our ever-changing world than against a genuine philosophy of being itself. Every philosopher can profit by the careful distinctions Maritain draws between the Bergson of fact and the Bergson of intention. This critique is a good example of how to consider and pay tribute to the genius and insight of a thinker while at the same time keeping track of error or inadequacy.

Technically, the focus of Bergsonian philosophy centers in a critique of the concept and consequent theories of being and knowledge which result—or are implied. Maritain's preface alone is a good summary of the points at issue and a handy guide to the suspicions of those who regard conceptual knowledge as a falsification of the real.

In the practical order, because of "spineless eclecticism" on the part of some Catholic philosophers, Bergson's philosophy of becoming had serious repercussions in theology, where his theory of the concept empties the dogmas of revealed religion of their content and furnishes Modernism an artistic intellectual foundation that can be quite compelling. Because of further consequences for the relations between intellect and will, Bergsonian intuition and philosophy of Duration also bear on certain recent types of "existential morality."

Maritain, in this early and powerful manifestation of what would later be the important role of the Catholic lay philosophy in modern Christian philosophy, delights the reader with that combination of technical proficiency and sensitive awareness of the larger issues of life which have won him his niche of fame in the history of contemporary philosophy.

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